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Abstract
The quality of 9-1-1 services can mean the difference between life and death. In
2015, national 9-1-1 organizations created a minimum standard for Public Safety
Answering Point (PSAP) comprehensive quality improvement programs, yet there is no
mandate for PSAPs to adopt such standards. This study focuses on quality improvement
perceptions among New York State (NYS) wireless PSAP leaders from an evidencebased management theory framework. The study addresses the primary research
question: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders support effective implementation of
quality care? Using directed content analysis out-transcripts from focus group sessions
with NYS wireless PSAP leaders, the following themes emerged: PSAP leaders support
effective implementation of quality care by achieving buy-in from stakeholders, building
trust as leaders, and using local data to support their decision-making processes. While
participants consistently agreed on general definitions of PSAP quality using a six
dimensional model, measuring quality was inconsistent from agency to agency. Time,
staffing, and funding were largely seen as barriers to effective implementation, while
other factors such as training and accreditation were viewed positively. Stakeholder
engagement and organizational culture were perceived as neutral, yet instrumental, to
success.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
9-1-1 was designed as a quick way to notify public safety agencies such as police
departments, fire departments, sheriff’s offices, ambulance companies, or independent 91-1 centers of an emergency. As public acceptance of 9-1-1 increased, Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs) were created to handle the calls made by people in distress.
The quality of 9-1-1 services can mean the difference between life and death, especially
for callers relying on the expertise of PSAP employees (DeLong v. County of Erie,
1982).
The demands and duties placed on PSAPs have grown due to technological
changes, civil cases alleging negligence, and the emergence of national standards of care.
As standards of care became more refined, states and local governments reacted by
creating governance structures to reinforce adherence to standards. Recently, nationally
recognized 9-1-1 organizations created a minimum standard for PSAP comprehensive
quality improvement programs (Association of Public Safety Communications Officials
[APCO], 2015). This dissertation studies the quality improvement perceptions of PSAP
leaders from an evidence-based management theoretical framework.
9-1-1 Standards Influence Model
To understand the development of nationally accepted 9-1-1 best practices, we
need to evaluate how different levels of governance, technology, civil cases, critical
incidents, and accreditation influenced how the 9-1-1 community performed their duties.
Figure 1.1 depicts a rudimentary model of the interactions among the multiple dynamics.
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The solid lines represent direct influential relationships, the dashed lines represent
loose or indirect influential relationships. The arrows depict the direction of influence.
One line, between the state government and local PSAPs, is an alternating line because
the influential relationship depends on the state the PSAP is located within. Some states
directly control their PSAPs, whereas most states have an indirect influence on PSAPs.
Regardless of level of influence, some balance between local implementation and state
regulation must be achieved to optimize the standards of care adopted by PSAPs.
Federal, state, and local governance influences are discussed later.
The three major external influences are 9-1-1 technology, civil cases, and critical
incidents. They are external because they are outside the control of the PSAP community
and may reflect public demands of PSAPs. No one can predict how technology will
influence the transport, delivery, and display of 9-1-1 information, or what new
innovations will come along changing how PSAPs handle that same information.
Similarly, no one can predict what incident will result in a civil case being brought to
court nor the level of impact such cases will have on the PSAP community. Critical
incidents are unpredictable by nature. All three external influences will continue to
impact PSAP standards development as discussed later in this chapter.
Finally, accreditation influences local PSAP through self-regulation. Local
PSAPs must make the conscious decision to seek accreditation. The level of influence
depends on the standards of the accrediting authority.

2

Figure 1.1. 9-1-1 Standards Influence Model.
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9-1-1 History and Development
The first 9-1-1 call was made in Haleyville, Alabama in 1968 as a proof of
concept (National Emergency Number Association [NENA], n.d.-a). Since then,
communities slowly implemented 9-1-1 technologies, procedures, and best practices for
collecting information from callers, dispatching public safety agencies, and providing
critical updates to responders (Athey & Stern, 2002; Ornato, 2013; Shah, Bishop, Lerner,
Czapranski, & Davis, 2003). Many of the procedures or practices in use today arose out
of changes in technology (APCO, 2013; Athey & Stern, 2002; Hevesy, 2004) and tragedy
(9/11 Commission, 2004; APCO, 2015; DeLong v. County of Erie, 1982). Both
technology and tragedy influenced federal, state, and local governments to change
policies, procedures, and governance models to meet the demands of the public. The
emergence of national standards of care and the 2015 adoption of a minimum standard
for comprehensive quality improvement programs (APCO, 2015) influenced local PSAP
decisions regarding staffing, policy development, and accreditation.
Technology and technological change. The adoption of 9-1-1 as the primary
emergency contact number progressed during the 1970s to the 1980s as public safety
agencies established telephone routing agreements with the local telephone carrier. Basic
9-1-1 only provided free call routing to the designated PSAP within the community
(NENA, n.d-a). Most PSAPs were created within existing local public safety agencies as
communities transitioned from local seven-digit emergency lines to 9-1-1.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Enhanced 9-1-1 services provided PSAPs with detailed
information about the caller’s phone number and the address associated with the phone
line (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA], 2013). The new
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technology led agencies to purchase more complex equipment in order to receive the call
data and enter that information into Computer Aided Dispatch or “CAD” Systems (Athey
& Stern, 2002). A CAD system is a networked data management system that allows a 91-1 telecommunicator to type information received from the 9-1-1 call such as location,
caller name, what type of services were requested, and other narrative entries. The CAD
uses the location and the requested services to determine what public safety agencies to
send, how many of each responder unit type are needed, and if a response plan existed for
that type of emergency.
The 1999 Wireless and Public Safety Telecommunications Act established 9-1-1
as the national emergency number and provided a timeline to adopt changes in wireless
9-1-1 technology (NHTSA, 2013). As wireless technology and mobile devices became
smaller and more popular, PSAPs adopted wireless location technology allowing centers
to locate cellular phone callers to within 300 meters in any direction, an area
encompassing approximately 70 acres (NHTSA, 2013). Although the technology
provided unique advantages, it also created significant challenges.
Approximately 70% of all 9-1-1 calls come from wireless devices, many of them
accidental (NENA, n.d.-b). PSAPs have to spend time trying to locate the caller within
that 70-acre footprint, which is roughly the size of three to four city blocks or a small
college campus. Considering the phone is mobile, that 70-acre footprint is constantly
moving, such as a prank call from a student on a school bus. Additionally, PSAP
employees, professionally known as telecommunicators, have to stay on the line to
determine if the caller is deaf, hard of hearing, under duress, or if the caller accidentally
called 9-1-1.
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Internet-based callers pose significant challenges as the location information
provided to PSAPs from voice over Internet providers, such as Vonage or Spectrum
Cable, is based on the home address the customers enter into their account (Rushnak,
2007). For example, a student attending college in Kansas uses his or her parent’s
Vonage account from Massachusetts. A 9-1-1 Internet call from that student in Kansas
will be routed to the PSAP that services the parent’s home in Massachusetts instead of
the local PSAP in Kansas. The misrouted call causes confusion and delays as there is
currently no way to transfer the 9-1- 1 call back to Kansas. In some instances, the
consequences are deadly as responders are sent to the incorrect location (Londono, 2006).
9-1-1 civil cases and liability. One of the landmark cases taught to many new
telecommunicators was the 1976 case of DeLong v. County of Erie (APCO, 2005;
Clawson, Dernocoeur, & Rose, 2012). In 1976, Amalia DeLong called 9-1-1 telling the
calltaker there was a burglar trying to break into her house. She lived approximately
1,300 feet from the Village of Kenmore Police Department (Roberts, 1983, para. 6). Her
9-1-1 call was routed to the Erie County PSAP where the calltaker told her police would
be sent “right away” (DeLong v. County of Erie, 1982, para. 3). Unfortunately, the
calltaker assumed the call came from the City of Buffalo and sent the wrong agency to
the wrong address. Amalia died of her stabbing wounds because when Buffalo Police
determined no such address existed in the City of Buffalo, the dispatchers never took
further action. Amalia’s husband sued the County of Erie for wrongful death and won.
The case became a trigger event resulting in changes in procedure and technology
within the 911 community. It established the legal precedent that a municipality could be
sued for negligence and 9-1-1 telecommunicators had a legal duty to act (DeLong v.
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County of Erie, 1982). It also established the critical nature of determining a caller’s
location. In 1976, Enhanced 9-1-1 did not exist. The telecommunicator had no
geographical reference when Amalia stated her address was 319 Victoria. The
telecommunicator assumed she meant Victoria Avenue in the City of Buffalo, not
Victoria Boulevard in the Village of Kenmore. The need to accurately locate callers
became the basis for a majority of 9-1-1 technological advances such as Enhanced 9-1-1
which could have made the difference in Amalia’s case if the telecommunicator had the
caller’s community (e.g., the Village of Kenmore) available.
Despite technological advances, accurately passing location to responders served
as the focus of another wrongful death case in 2008. Denise Amber Lee was kidnapped,
raped, and murdered despite at least five 9-1-1 calls regarding her location, one of which
Denise made from the cell phone of her captor. The final call was from a witness who
called 9-1-1 and gave accurate location information to a telecommunicator as she
followed Denise and her abductor for “more than nine minutes, identifying cross streets
as she continued driving” (Denise Amber Lee Foundation [DALF], 2016, para. 1).
Inefficiencies within the 9-1-1 system, poor training, and gross negligence were key
allegations in Nathan Lee’s suit settled the day after telecommunicators testified in court
to agency incompetence (Eckhart, 2012). Using money from the suit and the national
attention it garnered, the Denise Amber Lee Foundation partnered with national
organizations such as the Association of Public Safety Officials (APCO) and the National
Emergency Number Association (NENA) to establish quality improvement standards for
all PSAPs in the United States (APCO, 2013a; APCO, 2015; DALF, 2016).
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Critical incidents and public awareness. For this dissertation, critical incidents
are events that overwhelm the coping mechanisms of individuals or response systems
forcing them into crisis (Everly, Flannery, & Mitchell, 2000). Critical incidents can
impact the consciousness of a community at the local, state, national, and international
level. International critical incidents such as the September 11, 2001 terror attacks can
change public safety responder training, protocols, technologies, and funding priorities.
Emergence of 9-1-1 national standards of care. Concurrent to civil cases,
national 9-1-1 associations, vendors, and the 9-1-1 community slowly adopted national
minimum standards of care based on medical practice, civil case law, federal, and state
laws. Jeff Clawson developed the Medical Priority Dispatch System in 1976 to improve
patient outcomes, specifically by encouraging PSAPs to provide medical instructions
over the phone to reduce the time from call to interventions such as Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation (National Academy of EMD [NAED], 2012). The protocols, standards,
and quality improvement measures collectively became called emergency medical
dispatch (EMD). Clawson, later known as “the father of EMD,” worked with states, local
agencies and public safety attorneys to establish EMD not only as a legally defensible
protocol, but a legally mandatory duty to act (NAED, 2012, p. xii)
As the expectations of the public grew thanks to shows like Rescue 911, the duty
of PSAPs to provide lifesaving instructions also grew (APCO, 2013a; APCO, 2015;
NAED, 2012). Civil liability concepts such as negligent retention, failure to train,
telecommunicator abandonment, and detrimental reliance became part of initial and
supervisory 9-1-1 courses due to cases where 9-1-1 telecommunicators or the PSAP
failed to take appropriate action (APCO, 2005; APCO, 2009; APCO, 2011; APCO,
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2013a; NAED, 2012). To combat inconsistencies in 9-1-1 operation, national
organizations published standards and agreed to legally support agencies that adopted
such standards (APCO, 2011; NAED, 2012). Some organizations such as NAED and
Canadian American Law Enforcement Association, or state sheriff’s associations offer
accreditation to agencies meeting such standards.
Federal and state agencies looked to nationally adopted standards for consensus
regarding both 9-1-1 technology and operational standards. The federal government and
state governments, such as New York, identified the APCO P25 interoperable radio
standard as minimum requirements for grant funding (New York State Department of
Homeland Security and Emergency Services [NYSDHSES], 2016a; United States
Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 2016). The federal government, Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
and states sought both APCO and NENA comments to develop wireless 9-1-1 technology
standards while drafting the 1999 Wireless and Public Safety Telecommunications Act
(NENA, n.d.-a; NHTSA, 2013). As of 2013, APCO (2013b) reported 32 states adopted
mandatory minimum training standards for new 9-1-1 center telecommunicators,
including New York State (APCO, 2013b; 21 NYCRR § 5200, n.d.). However,
regulations wildly vary from state to state and some states mandate training for only a
select portion of PSAPs (NHTSA, 2013; NYSDHSES, 2015).
Growth of statewide 9-1-1 governance structures. Although there is a
movement to create standardized protocols and consolidate PSAPs, most centers in the
United States remain largely decentralized with limited state or federal oversight into
their daily operations. Development of 9-1-1 systems began primarily as local and state
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facilitated endeavors, managed at the local level, with little governance regarding
coordination between municipal or state jurisdictions (NHTSA, 2013; United States
Department of Transportation [USDOT], 2013). A 2010 national survey of 1,924 PSAPs
revealed the average number of dispatchers is 16.37 (SD 21.55, median 10, range 6-16),
showing most centers remained relatively small (Sutter et al., 2015). National and state
laws regarding 9-1-1 funding mechanisms and the emergence of Next Generation 9-1-1
technological challenges thrust state governments into the forefront of 9-1-1 governance
structures across the country (NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 2013).
Enhanced 9-1-1 and Wireless 9-1-1 location technological advances required
significant changes to local 9-1-1 system equipment, which many local agencies could
not afford. Therefore, states developed funding streams to offset the equipment costs in
return for some state 9-1-1 governance over local centers (Athey & Stern, 2002; Hevesy,
2014; NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 2013). Federal laws such as the Wireless
Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, Enhance 911 Act of 2004, and FCC
regulations reinforced states as the appropriate governing authority, yet did not explicitly
mandate such governance (NHTSA, 2013). As a result, states developed uneven
governance structures across a wide range of oversight. State laws determined local
surcharges, excise taxes, or universal service fund revenues remitted to local or state
agencies, but most state laws “stop short of addressing the full operational scope of 9-1-1
service” such as minimum training standards, staffing, quality improvement, or other best
practices (NHTSA, 2013, p. 14).
In 2013, the USDOT identified seven broad categories defining the level of state
oversight and categorized a majority (n=31) of states as having “State-level 9-1-1
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authority with statewide geographic planning, coordination, funding responsibility for
full scope of 9-1-1” (p. 10). Most state 9-1-1 governance structures were part of another
state agency and not a dedicated authority (NHTSA, 2013; USDOT 2013). Interestingly,
Georgia’s state 9-1-1 plan was viewed by the federal government as a “good example”
for other states (NHTSA, 2013, p. 49), but a 2015 telecast showed the Georgia board
failed to meet for years because there was no one appointed to the board (Keefe & Kish,
2015). Even more remarkable, was the fact that five states had little to no state oversight
of 9-1-1 operations as of 2013 (NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 2013). A description depicting
state 9-1-1 governance is in Appendix A.
State of New York 9-1-1 governance. Like many other states, the State of New
York’s 9-1-1 governance began primarily as a means to fund changes in 9-1-1
technology. In 1989, New York passed the Enhanced Emergency Telephone System
Surcharge Law creating state and county 9-1-1 surcharges to fund wireline services and
equipment. In 1991, the State of New York amended the law to establish wireless 9-1-1
surcharges (Hevesy, 2004).
In 2002, the State of New York established a State 9-1-1 Board and the Wireless
Expedited Deployment Funding program to help counties achieve the FCC mandated
wireless phase II location requirements established in the federal 1999 Wireless and
Public Safety Telecommunications Act (Hevesy, 2004). The State 9-1-1 Board created
the minimum adopted standards covering initial training requirements, minimum staffing,
continuing education, emergency medical dispatch, and 911 technology required for
county wireless PSAPs (21 NYCRR § 5200, n.d.). Adherence to the adopted standards
was a prerequisite for counties wishing to apply for expedited deployment funds or any
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state 9-1-1 funding. The NYS adopted standards (21 NYCRR § 5200, n.d.) referenced
nationally adopted standards and courses from organizations such as APCO, NAED, and
the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA).
Despite formally adopting standards, instituting an inspection regime, and tying
funding to standards, the NYS standard only applied to counties operating wireless
PSAPs. By law, only one wireless PSAP was permitted per county, therefore the
standards applied to only 56 of the 191 of PSAPs throughout the State of New York (21
NYCRR § 5200, n.d.; FCC, July 31, 2017). In 2010, the State of New York abandoned
its inspection regime and absorbed the function of the 9-1-1 board within the newly
created State Interoperable and Emergency Communications Board. In 2015, members
of the board actively complained that the standards are not applied to all PSAPs and
expressed a desire to adopt changes to NY standards that aligned with national standards
such as APCO, NENA, and ANSI (NYSDHSES, 2015). By November 2016, the state
failed to make progress on either front citing legal and technological barriers while
promising to take the board’s concerns “under advisement” (NYSDHSES, 2016b, p. 3).
Within New York State, the differing applications of standards between wireless PSAPs
and non-wireless PSAPs combined with the abandonment of the inspection regime led to
9-1-1 service inconsistencies between communities.
Problem Statement
The quality of service provided by PSAPs is inconsistent due to the lack of
mandatory standards of care at the national, state, and local levels. This study
specifically focuses on quality improvement perceptions among New York State (NYS)
wireless PSAP leaders with regard to evidence-based management theory. As previously
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discussed, public demands on PSAP quality developed from technological changes, civil
cases alleging negligence, and the emergence of national recommended standards of care,
yet governments at all levels have been slow to create governance structures to reinforce
adherence to standards. Although nationally recognized 9-1- 1 organizations created a
minimum standard for PSAP comprehensive quality improvement programs (APCO,
2015) there is no explicit mandate for PSAPs to adopt such national standards.
Given no there are no universal mandates, there are inconsistencies in how
different PSAPs approach standards of care. More importantly, even if universal
standards of care exist there may be differing interpretations as PSAP leaders apply the
standards to their local situation. This study discusses how PSAP leaders’ interpretations
of quality converged while local quality improvement implementations diverged.
Additionally, there is little scholarly knowledge regarding how PSAP leaders
adapt national standards of care, evidence-based practices, and evidence-based
management decision making to their local context. While the relevant research
literature will be discussed at length in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, it is important to
note how little the academic community knows about PSAP quality improvement
programs, the evidence they use to select, implement, and sustain evidence-based
programs, and most importantly the factors impacting the decisions PSAP leaders make
regarding quality improvement and evidence-based management decisions.
Theoretical Rationale
Evidence-based management is “the basing of managerial decisions on the best
available evidence” (Robbins & Judge, 2017, p. 11). As governments and PSAP leaders
evaluate which standards to adopt or mandate by law, the evidence decision makers use
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to justify policy becomes critical to the success or failure of such policies. This next
section will briefly cover how proponents describe evidence-based management, critical
concerns regarding evidence-based theory, empirical support of the theory, and how
evidence-based management theory may apply to PSAP decision-makers.
Proponents of evidence-based management encourage leaders to bridge the
research-practice gap to achieve more desirable results in areas related to quality,
customer satisfaction, sales, and organizational effectiveness (Glaub, Frese, Fischer, &
Hoppe, 2014; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006; Rousseau & Olivas-Luján, 2013; Wright et al.,
2016). As the theory became more refined, the six specific steps of asking, acquiring,
appraising, aggregating, applying, and assessing became iterative processes for success
(Briner & Walshe, 2014; Morrell & Learmonth, 2015) despite claims that evidence-based
management is not a cookbook (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006; Rousseau & Olivas-Luján,
2013). More recently, adherents recommended opening the decision-making process to
more rigorous and contextual evaluation (Briner & Walshe, 2014; Wright et al., 2016).
Wright et al. (2016) concludes evidence-based management success requires a “more
balanced view . . . in which managers engage with evidence in context [emphasis added]”
(p. 175). Context is provided by situated experience underpinned by personal experience
and judgement (Wright et al., 2016). For PSAP leaders, evidence-based management
may serve as the link between theory and practice.
In contrast, critics of evidence-based management warn that overreliance on
certain forms of evidence as a panacea may not be in the public’s best interest (BoyesWatson & Pranis, 2012; Morrell et al., 2015). First, in attempting to remove rubbish and
other half-truths (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006), evidence-based management theorists
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denigrate other forms of knowing (Morrell & Learmonth, 2015; Morrell, Learmonth, &
Heracleous, 2015). Second, scholars are concerned with “Who decides what constitutes
evidence?”, “How can we know what we don’t know?”, and the dangers of policymakers producing evidence to match the predetermined success of their decisions
(McMillin, 2012; Morrell & Learmonth, 2015; Russell, 2012). Finally, critics question if
“Does the solution work?” should be the sole criteria when society decides to adopt a
solution. Ethical deliberations of “Should we do this?” need to enter the consciousness of
decision-makers (Boyes-Watson & Pranis, 2012; McMillin, 2012), especially considering
PSAP leaders’ ethical responsibilities to the public.
Although evidence-based management theorists prize randomized experimental
evidence of “what works,” there are little empirical studies on the effectiveness of EBM
(Briner & Walshe, 2014; Glaub et al., 2014; Morrell & Learmonth, 2015; Olola et al.,
2016; Wright et al., 2016). Some empirical studies showed that evidence-based
management processes may improve the quality of care provided by PSAPs in the areas
of quality improvement programs (Bhave, 2014), research knowledge (Olola et al., 2016),
medical protocols (Clawson et al., 2016), community leadership knowledge of evidencebased practices (Gloppen et al., 2016), and evidence-based practice implementations
(Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 2016). Interestingly, based on Kepes, Bennett,
and McDaniel’s (2014) hierarchy of evidence, the studies that best represented evidenced
based management ideals also fall within the lowest strata of “evidence.” This cognitive
dissonance led Wright et al. (2016) to call upon evidence-based management leaders to
open up the decision-making and evidence valuing process to narrative forms of
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knowing. The research studies discussed above support possible application of evidencebased management process to PSAP leadership decisions.
Complementing current research into evidence-based management, the adoption
of national standards of care fall into alignment with the principles of evidence-based
theory and practice (Olola et al., 2016). Although limited scholarly study exists on the
impact of quality management processes in a PSAP environment (Clawson, Cady,
Martin, & Sinclair, 1998), other studies using evidence-based theory may provide unique
insights into how the 9-1-1 community may close the research-practice gap to provide
better quality decision-making and outcomes (Olola et al., 2016). Furthermore,
approaching PSAP quality improvement reforms with an expectation that there are
multiple valid sources of evidence and context may provide the best opportunities for
organizational success (Briner & Walshe, 2014; Morrell & Learmonth, 2015; Wright et
al., 2016). Qualitative research into how PSAP leaders perceive quality improvement
programs, how they value different forms of evidence, and decision-making processes
helps us better understand the applicability of evidence-based management to PSAPs.
Statement of Purpose
The study explores how NYS wireless PSAP leaders evaluated the quality of
service telecommunicators provide to the public, what forms of evidence they used to
justify their quality improvement programs, and whether existing national standards of
care impacted their decisions. The study provides insight into what PSAP leaders
perceived as barriers to achieving quality and what factors they believed contribute to
quality. Finally, the study analyzes and discusses the rich content provided by PSAP
leaders on these topics from an evidence-based management theoretical framework.
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Research Questions
The study addresses the primary research question: How do NYS Wireless PSAP
leaders support effective implementation of quality care? Four subordinate questions
provide insights into PSAP leader perceptions regarding the primary question. (a) How
do PSAP leaders measure performance based on their definition of quality? (b) How do
PSAP leaders perceive factors related to quality improvement? (c) When do PSAP
leaders believe evidence-based management theoretical frameworks, such as national
standards of care, should supersede local and personal experience frameworks; when do
they not? (d) How do PSAP leaders’ views align with evidence-based management
theory? The researcher performed guided discussions with focus groups consisting of
former and existing wireless NYS PSAP leaders followed by directed content analysis
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) to answer these research questions. This next section briefly
discusses each question and potential weaknesses that impacted the result of the study.
Sub-question 1: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders measure performance
based on their definition of quality? The sub-question was primarily aimed at
determining how PSAP leaders defined quality and what processes they used to measure
quality at their center. Some PSAP leaders used quality improvement programs
developed in accordance with national standards of care, others had a local program,
whereas many considered the absence of complaints as quality. Understanding both
similarities and, more importantly, variances in how PSAP leaders perceived quality help
researchers understand the thought processes behind decisions regarding PSAP quality
and inform national standard of care developers on what PSAP leaders believe is
practical to measure. Understanding how PSAP leaders define quality also sets
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boundaries for the primary research question, specifically what could be considered by
PSAP leaders as “quality care.”
Sub-question 2: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders perceive factors related
to quality improvement? This sub-question identified which factors PSAP leaders
believed were necessary for success, which factors were helpful but not necessary, and
which factors acted as barriers when implementing and sustaining a quality improvement
program in accordance with national standards of care. As discussed later in Chapter 2,
there are some factors previously identified by research findings such as time (Bartlett &
Francis-Smythe, 2016; Guo, Farnsworth, & Hermanson, 2015), trusted insiders (Walker,
Whitener, Trupin, & Migliarini, 2015; Wright et al., 2016), or organizational culture
(Olola et al., 2016; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Telep & Lum, 2014) that may influence the
success or failure of evidence-based quality improvement programs. PSAP leader
responses confirmed some of those same factors were present for PSAP standards
implementations. As a result of this study, evidence-based management theorists have
better evidence to support their theory. Despite general validation, some of the
assumptions made by proponents of evidence-based management need rethinking and
lack practicality given the lack of original research on PSAP operations. PSAP leaderidentified factors help future researchers better understand the “support” and
“implementation” portions of the primary research question.
Sub-question 3: Do PSAP leaders believe evidence-based management
theoretical frameworks, such as national standards of care, should supersede local
and personal experience frameworks? As discussed earlier in the introduction, PSAP
operations, policies, procedures, and adoption of national standards of care are locally
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derived decisions with limited influence by state or federal agencies. National standards
of care have emerged due to technological changes, civil liabilities, and changing public
expectations. This sub-question evaluated whether PSAP leaders perceived national
standards of care, particularly those associated with quality improvement, as valid
requirements or measurement instruments. PSAP leaders believed evidence-based
national standards of care were relevant, however, if PSAP leaders also shared significant
barriers such as time and cost preclude implementation. This study informs decision
makers on additional actions needed to achieve better PSAP quality. This sub-question
was strategically placed later in the focus group discussion to reinforce or break through
the “quality of care” definitions previously established by PSAP leaders during subquestion 1.
Sub-question 4: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders’ views align with
evidence-based management theory? This question identified alignment between what
PSAP leaders actually believe and what evidence-based management theorists propose.
Evidence-based management theorists posit the divide between research and practice may
be overcome through proper training and exposure (Briner & Walshe, 2014; Kepes,
Bennett, & McDaniel, 2014; Rousseau, 2006). Some research indicates leaders may
practice evidence-based management without realizing it or confound previously studied
research evidence with professional expertise (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016). The
answers to this sub-question exposed general agreement between theory and reality.
PSAP leaders advocated better use of local data and more original research on PSAP
operations to close the divide between theory and practice. Their comments revealed that
gap is not too large to bridge within the current theoretical framework. Connecting back
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to the primary research question, PSAP leaders remain central to the implementation of
programs and also construct what is viewed as “effective” for their organizations.
Potential Significance of the Study
There is scant empirical research on evidence-based management decisionmaking (Wright et al., 2016), PSAP quality improvement (Clawson et al., 1998), or
PSAP leaders as a population. The study provides new insight into how PSAP leaders
make decisions regarding the quality of service PSAPs provide to the public. The study
offers potential solutions to governments regarding which standards of care should be
adopted, what measures best define quality, and what factors including staffing and
funding may be necessary for success. Finally, the study assists our understanding of
how a relatively new theory, evidence-based management (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006;
Rousseau, 2006), aligns with PSAP leaders’ reality.
Definitions of Terms
For the purpose of this study, a public safety answering point or PSAP is a
“facility equipped and staffed to receive emergency and non-emergency public safety
calls for service via telephone and other communication devices (APCO, 2015, p. 16).
Also, a telecommunicator refers to anyone “whose primary responsibility is to receive,
process, transmit, and/or dispatch emergency and non-emergency calls for service for . . .
public safety services” (APCO, 2015, p. 16). Finally, a quality improvement program is
defined as an “on-going program providing, at a minimum, the random case review
evaluating emergency calltaking and dispatch performance, feedback on protocol
compliance, commendation, retraining and remediation as appropriate, and submission of
compliance data” to a PSAP (APCO, 2015, p. 17).
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Chapter 1 Summary
9-1-1 is designed to preserve life and property. The PSAPs that answer the call
have an established duty to provide quality public service, yet the definition of quality
varies from state to state and community to community. As national standards of care
emerged to meet public expectations PSAP decision makers in federal, state, and local
governments face difficult choices along a continuum between mandating adherence to
national standards and leaving quality improvement programmatic decisions solely to
local control. Evidence-based management theory proposes decisions regarding practice
are best informed by combining the best available research with local contextual data.
While some research studies support evidence-based management processes and
practices leading to better outcomes, there is little known about evidence-based
management theory applicability to a PSAP environment or the perceptions of PSAP
leaders regarding evidence-based quality improvement standards. This study answers
specific questions about how PSAP leaders measure quality, what factors PSAP leaders
perceive impact implementation of a quality improvement program, PSAP leader
receptivity to evidence-based management standards superseding personal experience
during decision-making processes regarding quality improvement, and how PSAP
leaders’ beliefs align with evidence-based theory.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
Literature Review Introduction and Purpose
Since its first use in 1968, 9-1-1 grew to be the primary emergency services
number in the United States of America (NENA, n.d.-a). As previously discussed in
Chapter 1, the quality of 9-1-1 services provided by telecommunicators can mean the
difference between life and death (APCO, 2013a; DeLong v. County of Erie, 1982). In
2015, the 9-1-1 community adopted a national minimum standard of care related to
quality improvement programs for the agencies that answer our 9-1-1 calls (APCO,
2015). Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP) are faced with multiple decisions
regarding whether or not to adopt the national quality improvement standards of care and
how to implement quality improvement measures within their organization. The
information from quality improvement programs can be used as local evidence to
support, refute, or even act as a research control for evidence-based practice within an
evidence-based management theoretical framework.
The purpose of this literature review is to evaluate the current research related to
evidence-based management implementation and quality improvement within a 9-1-1
environment. The review will initially discuss studies related to quality improvement
programs from an evidence-based practice paradigm, and how researchers linked
implementation of evidence-based practices to evidence-based management decision
making. The review will then analyze significant research findings related to how
evidence-based management implementation impacted, or was impacted by, individual
roles and organizational perspectives. Next the review will discuss research-identified
barriers to implementation and factors related to implementation success. The review
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will close with a brief methodological review, identification of research gaps, and
recommendations for further study.
Quality Improvement as Evidence-Based Practice and Management
Quality improvement can be an evidence-based practice or part of a larger
evidence-based management implementation (Bhave, 2014; Clawson et al., 1998;
Russell, 2012; Spector et al., 2015; Taylor & Campbell, 2011). The germinal study by
Clawson et al. (1998) showed significant 20% (n= 217, p < .001) increase in evidencebased telecommunicator protocol compliance after initiation of quality improvement
feedback sessions and continuing dispatch education (p. 3). At the time, Clawson et al.
(1998) was the only peer reviewed study that quantitatively measured the impact of
quality improvement in a PSAP environment.
Conducted nearly two decades ago, the 1998 Clawson et al. study served as a
bedrock assumption for future studies related to evidence-based practices within a PSAP
environment, such as those developed by the International Academies of Emergency
Dispatch (IAED) and its precursor the National Academy of Emergency Medical
Dispatch (Clawson et al., 2012). Shah, Bishop, Lerner, Czapranski, and Davis (2003)
researched emergency telecommunicator protocols developed by the National Academy
of Emergency Medical Dispatch and revealed telecommunicators who complied to
academy accredited quality standards were able to differentiate between low acuity
patients (needing less emergency intervention) from more critical patients 94.8% of the
time thus reducing emergency response costs and reducing risk to the public from
ambulances needlessly responding with lights and sirens (p. 3).
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More recent evidence-based practice research on the effectiveness of stroke
diagnostic tools (Clawson et al., 2016), telecommunicator call processing times for
structure fire protocols (Dornseif et al., 2016), perceived value of differing PSAP training
techniques (Sebresos, Olola, Scott, & Clawson, 2016), and effectiveness of
telecommunicators pre-alerting dispatched agencies to suspected cardiac arrest (Weiser et
al., 2013) specifically selected PSAPs that achieved, or were about to achieve, Accredited
Center of Excellence status from the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch.
The International Academies of Emergency Dispatch certify telecommunicators on the
use of their evidence-based protocols, and more stringently certify PSAPs’ quality
improvement programs related to protocol compliance (International Academies of
Emergency Dispatch [IAED], n.d.). PSAPs must demonstrate specific quality
improvement parameters for telecommunicator protocol compliance, quality
improvement program policies and procedures, and local quality improvement
governance structures in order to achieve Accredited Center of Excellence status (IAED,
n.d.; IAED, 2014). Researchers in the above studies controlled for adherence to the
intervention or protocol being studied by using accredited PSAPs because researchers,
and in particular, Dornseif et al. (2016) “didn’t have the resources to review nearly
24,000 cases individually for compliance” (J. Dornseif, personal communication, March
15, 2017). For the researchers, PSAP accreditation and the quality improvement
programs that justify accreditation increased the validity of their measurement tools for
the protocols under study.
Similarly, an Accredited Center of Excellence PSAP served as the sample agency
for a study investigating changes in telecommunicator interest, understanding, and
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literacy of evidence-based research before and after watching a research education video
(Olola et al., 2016). While the non-randomized cohort study revealed a significant postintervention increase (52%, p < .05) in telecommunicators’ abilities to differentiate
between quantitative and qualitative research, the study also revealed only insignificant
increases in telecommunicator interest in research participation (Olola et al., 2016, p.24).
Olola et al. (2016) concluded the lack of increase in research participation was due to the
fact that the sample had volunteered for research, therefore demonstrating their
preexisting interest. Researchers also revealed the PSAP studied recently performed
quality improvement related research and internal data-gathering for accreditation
purposes (Olola et al., 2016). The PSAP’s preexisting organizational commitment to
quality and evidence-based practice was cited by Olola et al. (2016) as a study limitation
and may have been linked to evidence based management implementation and interest in
scholarly research.
Due to the limited availability of quality improvement and evidence-based
management research directly tied to the PSAP environment (which is discussed later
during the research gaps section), the subsequent portions of this review expanded the
scope of inquiry to other fields of study. Peer reviewed research studies that specifically
evaluated evidence-based management, the decision-making processes surrounding
implementation of evidence-based practice, or management views of evidence-based
practice were included. Studies with findings focused solely on the effectiveness of a
particular evidence-based practice were excluded. The review also focused on studies
related to quality improvement programs within call centers, but specifically excluded
studies related to the quality of language adaptations of non-native call centers servicing
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North American and United Kingdom based companies. The next sections will discuss
how researchers uncovered linkages between evidence-based management and evidencebased practice, discoveries on how evidence-based management impacted or is impacted
by differing roles and perspectives, findings concerning barriers to evidence-based
management, and factors identified as promoting evidence-based management.
Evidence Based Practice Linkage to Evidence-Based Management
Researchers found that the decision processes surrounding the implementation of
evidence-based or science-based practices may be inextricably linked to the evidencebased management process (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Briner & Walshe, 2014;
Glaub et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 2016).
Specifically, Wright et al. (2016) “identified the opportunity” to perform retroactive case
study on evidence-based management decision-making process as part of a larger
organizational study regarding the implementation of an evidence-based fast track
program within the emergency department at a large metropolitan hospital in Australia
(p. 163). While a majority of the Wright et al. (2016) case study’s findings are discussed
elsewhere in this review, the fact that evidence-based management implementation
themes and factors unintentionally emerged from the study of a different evidence-based
phenomenon is significant and relevant to how researchers can study evidence-based
management.
The apparent link between evidence-based practice and evidence-based
management was supported in other study findings such as Spiri and MacPhee (2013) in
which “participants frequently gave examples of EBM [evidence-based management] in
relation to EBP [evidence-based practice]” (p. 268) and Taylor and Campbell (2011)
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where 63% of social care workers thought that social care governance, a Northern Ireland
government sanctioned form of evidence-based management, was a “valuable process to
ensure quality of service and continuous improvement” (p. 263). A management student
participant in Briner and Walshe’s (2014) case study of evidence-based management
teaching stated, “I’m a lot more aware of the need for me to be quality control for the
research I use in the course of decision making” (p. 428). The linkage and overlaps
described in the above studies may help future researchers or literature reviewers uncover
evidence-based management when evaluating the decisions surrounding evidence-based
practice.
Evidence-Based Management Implementation Findings from Multiple Perspectives
Research into evidence-based management implementation or decision processes
surrounding evidence-based practice revealed roles and organizational culture influenced
whether or not evidence-based management succeeded (Glaub et al., 2014; Wright et al.,
2016), what evidence-based practice was ultimately selected (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe,
2016; Telep & Lum, 2014; Walker et al., 2015), and the level of evidence-based practice
sustainment achieved by such decisions (Crowley, Greenberg, Feinberg, Spoth, &
Redmond, 2012; Gloppen et al., 2016). The subsections below discuss what the studies
found related to senior management and owners, middle management and first-line
supervisors, trusted insiders, and external facilitators. Another subsection evaluates how
researchers found organizational culture as a neither a barrier nor a factor for success but
rather as a decision-making modifier.
Senior leadership and owners. Senior leadership and owners may have differing
views or roles in evidence-based management depending on the size of their organization
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(Crowley et al., 2012; Glaub et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2015; Telep & Lum, 2014). Senior
leaders from larger organizations have less time to “keep themselves updated on . . .
research findings” (Guo et al., 2015, p. 281). Although time is discussed at greater length
below, the fact that senior hospital administrators surveyed in Idaho cited lack of time as
the primary barrier to evidence-based management (Guo et al., 2015) suggested that
senior leadership in larger organizations may not be directly involved in either evidencebased management or evidence-based practice implementations, and was reinforced by
findings from other studies (Crowley et al., 2012; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al.,
2016). Quotes from senior leaders of larger organizations such as “ask the local school
counselor” (Crowley et al., 2012, p. 100) or those in middle management looking up
stating “the leader needs to evaluate all possible actions—not fire off a solution” (Spiri &
MacPhee, 2013, p. 270) indicated senior management may be aware of evidence-based
management principles, but not always directly engaged.
In contrast, smaller organizations with engaged leaders may have greater success
bridging the research-practice gap and permeating views on evidence-based management
within their organization (Glaub et al., 2014; Telep & Lum, 2014). Glaub et al. (2014)
discovered Ugandan small business owners employing evidence-based management
showed significant differences in gross sales revenues (Hotelling’s t = 7.20, p < .01, η2
=.07) and employee growth (Hotelling’s t =7.16, p < .05, η2 =.07) between the randomly
selected test group and waiting control group (p. 370). The test group showed increases
in all measured areas of success during the 12 month longitudinal study, whereas the
control group had decreases in gross sales and employees with five businesses failing
(Glaub et al., 2014).
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Similarly, a survey of officers in three different sized agencies showed greater
familiarity with the term “evidence-based policing” in the smallest of the agencies
(48.4%) as opposed to the largest agency (25.1%) surveyed (Telep & Lum 2014, p. 367).
The researchers concluded that the variance between the agencies may be due to the
progressive chief of the smaller organization “who actively advocated for crime-analysis
and evidence-based policing” (Telep & Lum’s 2014, p. 367). While not conclusive, the
literature points to differences in organizational size, senior leadership engagement, and
organizational distance between the decision maker and primary implementer as potential
factors to evidence-based management success.
Middle management and first-line supervisors. Middle managers and first-line
supervisors serve as the primary implementers, initial quality control, and sustainers of
evidence-based practices through evidence-based management (Armstrong, 2012; Bhave,
2014; Spector et al., 2015). Armstrong (2012) found first-line supervisors were “actively
involved in leadership activities including strategic planning, data evaluation, making
decisions from a ‘big picture’ perspective as well as enhanced supervision activities” (p.
435) while evaluating probation and community supervision personnel’s perceptions on
span of control or “the number of individuals, or resources, that a person can effectively
supervise” (p. 429). Bhave (2014) showed that supervisory use of electronic performance
monitoring of calls at a U.S. based customer service call center was positively, though
weakly, related to task performance (r = .18, p < .05) and organizational citizenship
behaviors (r = .23, p < .05) while the call quality coefficient estimate (b = 2.97, p < .05, β
= .53) was positive and statistically significant (p. 624). Likewise, a study on nursing
transition programs across three states found significant differences (all studies set alpha
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at 5%) between non-established and established transition programs with dedicated nurse
preceptors (Spector et al., 2015). Established programs with dedicated nurse preceptors
had the lowest patient errors and new nurse turnover, while also having the highest job
satisfaction over the course of the first year after leaving nursing school (Spector et al.,
2015, pp. 21-22).
Other research studies reinforced that middle managers and first-line supervisors
act as both users and creators of evidence critical to evidence-based management and
quality improvement implementations. Interestingly, Bhave (2014) found the opposite
result than expected regarding organizational citizenship behavior. Bhave (2104)
anticipated a negative relationship between supervisory use of evidence-based quality
assurance monitoring and employee attitudes regarding work quality. Instead, use of
quality assurance monitoring reinforced supervisory perceptions of good employees,
however Bhave (2014) cautioned this may be halo error where supervisors “assume a
singular performance dimension to classify subordinates as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’” (p.
628). One senior administration participant of the Armstong (2102) study “adamantly
claimed that the success of the jurisdiction’s probation department was dependent on
their first-line supervisors” (p. 435), while other participants noted that evidence-based
practice supervisors focused on “producing quality outcomes” for community supervised
clients (p. 435). Wright et al. (2016) described how the primary implementer of a fasttrack program, Dr. Clancy, provided “executive summaries of the literature in pamphlet
form” to promote evidence-based discussion (p. 169).
Contrastingly, Russell (2012) found telenursing managers in Australia failed to
provide clear guidance while creating a false dichotomy between professional experience
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and using evidence-based computer decision support software. “It’s almost like they
contradict themselves and say, ‘Yes use your clinical judgement but then no you’ve got
to stick to the algorithms’” (Russell, 2012, p. 202). Russell (2012) found this vacillation
created opportunities for counterproductive work behaviors where nurses actively
manipulated the algorithm to achieve the desired clinical outcome. The studies from
different scholarly disciplines and multiple populations may denote first-line supervisors
can have a dramatic impact on evidence-based management implementation.
Trusted insiders. Remarkably, the concept of a trusted insider as implementer
also emerged from the literature with the term specifically used by Wright et al. (2016, p.
171). Participants shared that “one of our own people” (Wright et al., 2016, p. 171) or
someone having “credibility within the tribe” (Walker et al., 2015, p. 33) was necessary
for evidence-based management success in the former and evidence-based practice
adoption in the latter studies. When considering resources for decision-making, hospital
administrators preferred local organizational data and information from “colleagues and
peers,” over professional websites, journals, and databases (Guo et al., 2015, p. 279).
Some organizations may actually exclude the input of others because, as a
telecommunicator participant in a study related to the emotional labor of PSAP workers
put it, “not everyone can do our job” (Shuler & Sypher, 2000, p. 75).
While evidence-based management may be seen as having intrinsic value, the
decisive factor in implementation may be who is actually promoting the practice. For
instance, researchers studying what evidence-based management meant to Brazilian
senior nurse administrators used the following quote as support a “skilled team leader or
manager” was necessary for evidence-based management success: “I emphasize that the
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techniques and methods, such as using sepsis bundles (example of EBP [evidence-based
practice]), are useful, but the key is the leader who involves her multidisciplinary team”
(Spiri & MacPhee, 2013, p. 269). Likewise, trust in the messenger was a major theme of
the Wright et al. (2016) case study surrounding, Dr. Clancy:
He blows me away. He puts up the data and the equations and the mathematics. .
. . If he’s put that much thought and that much process and that much passion
into it then I’d be horrified to think anyone would disagree. (p. 171)
As shown in the quotes above, trust was earned by the implementer through a
variety of persuasive methods including empirical, personal, and not yet discussed,
political. Going back to Wright et al. (2016), Dr. Clancy was “given the mandate by the
team” because of the organizational crisis of solving the fast-track problem in the
emergency department (p.167). Similarly, a police department with a chief espousing
evidence-based values showed 81.0% of police officers thought hot spot policing, a
research proven evidence-based practice, was effective at stopping crime as opposed to
the 3.5% officer endorsement of hot spot policing from a larger police organization
without engaged leadership (Telep & Lum, 2014, p. 371). In each study discussed, the
trusted insider was imbued with the political power by key stakeholders to enact the
evidence-based practice.
External facilitators. External facilitators, whom for the purpose of this review
includes consultants, organizational psychologists, technical assistants, or other perceived
non-member individuals, may have an additional challenge when helping organizations
implement evidence-based management or a particular evidence-based practice because
they must overcome the immediate hurdle of trust. While trust building and brokering
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trust are not within the scope of this review, it is important to note reactions from leaders
and stakeholders regarding external facilitators. Guo et al. (2015) found hospital
administrators surveyed in Idaho turned to external consultants last when “facing major
decision-making in their health care organizations” (p. 279). More poignantly, a senior
health care executive in Australia bluntly said, “I’m not a big fan of management
consultants” (Wright et al., 2016, p. 167). The above sentiments from different studies
of similar populations on opposite sides of the planet may explain why similar
organizational changes were rejected when presented formally by external facilitators but
accepted when proposed by a trusted insider (Guo et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2016).
External facilitators such as organizational psychologists may even temper their
recommendations or even the research language used to justify the proposed evidencebased practice in order to meet client expectations (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016).
Bartlett and Francis-Smythe (2016) found “concerns around client demands and
acceptability to the client are more frequently considered than evidence from the
scientific research literature (p. 621). While 79.1% of United Kingdom organizational
psychologist participants encouraged clients to focus on the importance of evidence,
interestingly “both personal experience and professional expertise also appeared to
supersede scientific research evidence” (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016, p.622). While
initially contradictory, Bartlett and Francis-Smythe’s (2016) interview data indicated that
their participants may have confounded the differences between previously studied
scientific research evidence with current personal knowledge and professional
experience, “it’s like so old and so ingrained now . . . it’s a methodology really” (p. 623).
The above findings are not surprising considering external facilitators are hired for their
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subject matter expertise, but the above revelations may reflect areas for further study and
consideration when evaluating how evidence is perceived.
The purpose of external facilitators, however, is to impart knowledge and
expertise on the organization or community so leaders and managers can implement and
sustain evidence-based management (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Crowley et al.,
2012). Two separate studies from competing community programs aimed at reducing
youth substance abuse, PROSPER (Crowley et al., 2012) and Communities that Care
(Gloppen et al., 2016), evaluated how long-term external facilitators impacted
community knowledge of evidence based-practices. Both multiyear longitudinal studies,
using paired randomized communities, revealed leaders of communities receiving
external facilitator support had greater evidence-based program adoption and community
leader knowledge of evidence-based practices than their control community counterparts
years after external facilitator financial support was withdrawn (Crowley et al., 2012;
Gloppen et al., 2016). In the case of the two studies above, long-term support resulted in
long-term improvements in evidence-based management knowledge and expertise. Yet,
looking deeper, future research needs to determine if the two studies described above
were more than self-congratulatory advertisements as opposed to identifying
generalizable factors for evidence-based management implementation success.
Organizational culture. Organizational culture matters. Research findings
indicated organizational culture can be a barrier (Russell, 2012; Taylor & Campbell,
2011; Telep & Lum, 2014) or facilitator (Olola et al., 2016; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013)
when implementing evidence-based management. Organizational culture also
consistently appeared as a discriminator when evidence-based practices are selected
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(Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Crowley et al., 2012; Walker et al., 2015).
Organizational culture may also change as a result of evidence-based management
(Gloppen et al., 2016; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013). The next section explores research
findings in each of these cases and the moderating impact organizational culture plays.
Organizational culture can be a barrier to evidence-based management.
Researchers found when leadership fails to guide employees regarding the proper balance
between evidence-based practice (e.g., using the algorithm) and professional experience
(e.g., use your clinical judgment), the resulting counterproductive work behaviors may
confound the decision-making process surrounding the implementation of an evidencebased practice (Russell, 2012). Russell (2012) noted how the use of software algorithms
and focusing on a single chief complaint “militates against the more holistic practices that
nurses advocate (p.202). More concerning, if the locally derived data is unsound because
employees are purposely manipulating the system, the subsequent managerial decisions
regarding the effectiveness of a particular intervention, algorithm sequencing, or even
decisions related to which software to select, then become fruit of the poisoned tree. As
revealed by the Russell (2012) study, the inability of nurses and mangers to solve this
incongruence of professional culture and risk management became a self-defeating echo
chamber of espoused values versus administrative control.
Likewise, organizational cultures regarding internal subgroups can also act as
barriers to evidence-based management. If two internal groups do not trust each other,
locally derived data used to inform the effectiveness, or more importantly the
ineffectiveness, of a particular practice may be ignored or disregarded as unreliable.
Telep and Lum, (2014), specifically cited the “cultural divide” between police officers
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and their civilian crime analysts as a potential barrier to officer’s receptivity of evidencebased practice (p. 363). Guo et al. (2015) also found hospital administrators and doctors
regularly used in-house hospital librarians to help research clinical approaches to patient
care but failed to engage hospital librarians’ assistance when making managerial
decisions. Guo et al. (2015) represented one of the few reviewed studies where evidencebased practice decisions were divorced from evidence-based management decisions
while simultaneously speaking to how culture defines internal roles within organizations
and how those roles influence evidence-based management implementation.
Conversely, organizational culture can facilitate or even accelerate how evidencebased managers implement and develop evidence-based practice. Spiri and MacPhee’s
(2013) phenomenological study revealed when a hospital’s “culture endorses quality and
safety standards, and the quality / safety culture is reflected in organizational services,
practices, and policies,” evidence-based management has fertile soil for growth (p. 269).
Olola et al. (2016) found the culture of an organization that was “already adhering to the
field’s accepted best practices . . . and regular, standardized review of emergency calls”
(p. 230) may have contributed to the telecommunicators high interest in PSAP specific
research prior to the intervention. Developing a “culture of research” is critical to the
advancement of new evidence-based practices and management techniques, and
organizations who come predisposed towards research may have an advantage when it
comes to implementation (Olola et al., 2016).
Organizational culture discriminates what evidence-based practices are
“acceptable” (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016, p. 615). In their grounded theory study
with Native American community leaders, Walker, Whitener, Trupin, and Migliarini
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(2015) found participants strongly favored evidence-based programs “when there was a
perception that family tradition and culture was valued and could be incorporated into the
curriculum and implementation process” and when “alignment with cultural values”
could be achieved (p. 33). Bartlett and Francis-Smythe (2016) discovered organizational
psychologists would “fit the research . . . around a consideration of the particular ways in
which a concept had been theorized (and operationalized) in the research literature vis-àvis the way in which it manifested itself in the ‘situated context’ of practice” (p. 624).
Crowley et al. (2012) revealed community leaders “reported selecting effective programs
that had adequate organizational or participant fit (‘right program for our kids’) as a
method believed to maintain program fidelity” (p. 101). The above studies illustrated
why matching the correct evidence-based practice to the organizational culture is a core
function of evidence-based management and may determine success or failure.
Barriers to Evidence-Based Management Implementation
Failures occur, despite having the best available evidence to support a decision,
practice, or organizational change. Perhaps the research was not the correct fit for the
organization or the correct research was incorrectly applied (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe,
2016; Briner & Walshe, 2014; Crowley et al., 2012; Russell, 2012). Perhaps the
incorrect person or agency, who lacked trust and political mandates attempted to force an
evidence-based solution (Wright et al., 2016). Or, perhaps senior leadership was
unconvinced the organizational changes were worth the time and costs associated with
evidence-based management implementation (Guo et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013).
The next section will cover specific research-identified barriers to evidence-based
management implementation. Barriers such as lack of training, research skills, and
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access to scholarly research may be overcome with a medium level of effort.
Contrariwise, barriers such as time and costs may represent significant barriers requiring
dedicated planning and resources to overcome.
Lack of evidence-based management training. Evidence-based management
requires not only initial awareness but also management support for continuing training.
Armstrong’s (2012) participants noted that evidence-based management “requires
significant supervisor–officer interaction, ongoing training, feedback, as well as quality
assurance to master these skills” (p. 442). Among hospital administrators, Guo et al.
(2015) discovered “lack of training” as the second most prevalent barrier to evidencebased management (p. 280). Taylor and Campbell (2011) found over 40% of Northern
Ireland social workers “regarded themselves as having little or no knowledge about SCG
[social care governance],” the state-sponsored evidence-based model for social work
(p.262). As discussed earlier, managers may already be employing evidence-based
management without realizing they are doing it (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Taylor
& Campbell, 2011), but specific training is also necessary for proper evidence-based
management implementation (Briner & Walshe, 2014).
Lack of training and exposure to evidence-based management may be a common
barrier to evidence-based management, but it may not require significant effort to
surmount. Evidence-based management training can have significant impacts on leaders’
long-term evidence-based practice awareness, planning, internal data collection, program
selection, and program fidelity practices (Briner & Walshe, 2014; Crowley et al., 2012;
Glaub et al., 2014; Gloppen et al., 2016; Taylor & Campbell, 2011). More specifically,
Gloppen et al. (2016) found, in a randomized experiment, community leaders receiving
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training had a “four times greater odds of reporting a one-stage higher level of adoption
than control key leaders” (p. 85). As previously discussed, Glaub et al. (2014) showed
small business owners who received evidence-based management training had better
business results as opposed to those in the waiting control group. The studies highlighted
not only that training may have a positive impact on outcomes, but training may also be
the difference between organizational or community leaders’ perceptions of scholarly
research.
Lack of research skills. Evidence-based management theory espouses that the
best decisions come from the best evidence (Kepes et al., 2014; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006;
Rousseau, 2006). The best evidence from research studies means nothing if managers do
not know the research exists, cannot find it, or evaluate its worth respective to the body of
knowledge (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Guo et al., 2015; Olola et al., 2016). Lack
of research appraisal and search skills was listed by Guo et al. (2015) as the fifth and
sixth most prevalent barriers respectively to evidence-based management among
surveyed Idaho hospital administrators (p. 280). Similarly, difficulty finding relevant
evidence was the third most prevalent barrier to research study utilization identified by
interviewed organizational psychologists (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016, p. 625).
Again, managers can overcome lack of search and appraisal skills with moderate
effort. Briner and Walshe (2014) described in great detail how managers successfully
incorporated rapid evidence assessment into their professional work lives with a
moderate level of effort over eleven sessions lasting three hours each. Another research
identified option was to use people within the organization, such as hospital librarians,
who had expertise in scholarly database searches to assist in the research process (Guo et
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al., 2015). Crowley et al. (2012) found, in a random trial, community leaders who
received research training had better standards of evidence evaluation skills that those in
control communities, F (3, 707) =3.12, p <. 05 (p. 103). Regardless of the methods used
by managers, being able to successfully find, evaluate, and appropriately apply research
to the given organizational situation appeared critical to closing the research-practice gap
(Briner & Walshe, 2014; Glaub et al., 2014; Taylor & Campbell, 2011).
Lack of access to scholarly research. Access to research in the information age
may be not seem like a barrier, but knowledge is not always free (Bartlett & FrancisSmythe, 2016). Guo et al. (2015), and, more recently, Bartlett and Francis-Smythe
(2016) identified lack of access to information as a barrier to evidence-based
management implementation. Bartlett & Francis-Smythe (2016) specifically cited “full
access to the research literature is usually via gate-keepered, subscription-based services”
(p. 625). Managers seeking research related to their organizational decisions may reach
such gates, find them locked, and either seek counsel elsewhere or give up the inquiry
entirely.
Once more again, this barrier may be overcome by managers with a moderate
level of effort. Researchers discovered managers accessed research literature using
public or education-based library services (Briner & Walshe, 2014) and in house
organizational staff with professional subscriptions (Guo et al., 2015). Bartlett and
Francis-Smythe (2016) indicated managers can overcome lack of access by just asking
for help from peers or contacts with access. All the above methods overcame short-term
access requirements to research the literature. If there was a longstanding need for
continual access, managers also subscribed to field specific web services providing
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access to peer review or programmatically vetted research materials (Crowley et al.,
2012; Gloppen et al., 2016). The studies above showed how resilient managers worked
around the access barrier.
Time as a barrier. Time is a non-renewable resource. For managers, once it is
expended, it can never be recovered. This may be the reason why researchers found lack
of time among the top barriers or concerns for evidence-based management
implementation (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Guo et al., 2015). It takes time to find
and evaluate the research literature (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Briner & Walshe,
2014; Guo et al., 2015; Taylor & Campbell, 2011). It takes time to convince senior
leadership and key stakeholders to adopt a particular evidence-based practice (Spiri &
MacPhee, 2013; Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Wright et al., 2016) and then implement a
given evidence-based program (Walker et al., 2015). It takes time to perform (Spiri &
MacPhee, 2013), evaluate performance (Bhave, 2014), or supervise evidence-based
practices (Armstrong, 2012; Taylor & Campbell, 2011). Most importantly, it takes a
longer time, and with that patience, to study and understand the long-term benefits of
such evidence-based management decisions (Crowley et al., 2012; Glaub et al., 2014;
Gloppen et al., 2016; Spector et al., 2015).
Time is not a barrier that managers overcame with little effort; rather, research
showed effective evidence-based management implementations required planning for the
time commitments inherent to the evidence-based process (Armstrong, 2012; Bhave,
2014). More specifically, Armstrong (2012) found participants believed first-line
supervisors needed more time for direct observation, data entry, data analysis, and quality
improvement assessments as part of a larger evidence-based management model. To
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account for the increased demand on supervisors’ time, organizations needed to closely
evaluate the proper span of control, or ratio, of first-line supervisors to probation officers
or community supervision staff (Armstrong; 2012).
Similarly, Bhave (2014) showed time between electronic performance monitoring
assessments was “negatively related to task performance, b = –.04, p < .05, β = –.04”
when controlled for the initial levels of customer service representative performance at
the previous assessment period (p. 616). Bhave (2014) and Armstrong (2012) suggested
supervisors needed more frequent meetings with subordinates to discuss assessments if
they wanted task performance improvement, thus supporting the view that evidencebased management necessitated strategic planning for time requirements. For the studies
above, time translated to a human resource capital expenditure.
Cost as a barrier. The primary goal of evidence-based management is to make
better decisions consequently improving quality, reducing waste, avoiding costly
mistakes, and capitalizing on opportunities (Rousseau, 2006). However, there are costs
associated with evidence-based management in terms of fiscal (Crowley et al., 2012;
Gloppen et al., 2016), human (Armstrong, 2012; Briner & Walshe, 2014; Guo et al.,
2015), and political capital (Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Wright et al., 2016). For both
PROSPER (Crowley et al., 2012) and Communities that Care (Gloppen et al., 2016)
programs, communities received grant funding to pay technical assistants to administer
the evidence-based youth substance abuse programs and assist leaders in their evidencebased training. Once grant funding ended, communities had to find other sources of
revenue to sustain the program such as other grants or raised the funds locally (Crowley
et al., 2012). As previously mentioned in the section above, evidence-based practice
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seemingly required more time and attention from first-line supervisors to sustain and
effectively monitor performance which may translate to greater human capital needs
(Armstrong, 2012). There is also political risk and cost associated with implementing
evidence-based management, especially if one particular individual is given the mandate
to fix the problem as was the situation described in the Wright et al. (2016) study.
Not all costs associated with evidence-based management decisions translated to
immediate returns on investment. While Ugandan small business owners saw fiscal
returns on their investment in the relatively short period of 12 months (Glaub et al.,
2014), it took years for the benefits of youth substance abuse programs to be known
(Crowley et al., 2012; Gloppen et al., 2016). Some studies showed no fiscal returns at all
due the public service nature of the subjects or participants studied such as social work
(Taylor & Campbell, 2011), police services (Telep & Lum, 2014), or PSAP services
(Clawson et al., 1998; Weiser et al., 2013).
More importantly, managers who incorrectly apply evidence-based measures,
such as medical algorithm software for telenursing call centers, can have the opposite in
intended consequences (Russell, 2012). The long-term costs and commitments required
may cause leaders to shy away from particular evidence-based management interventions
(Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Guo et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2015). Evidence-based
leaders, therefore, must build consensus that the researched and identified costs
associated with evidence-based management are worth the benefit to the organization.
Factors of Successful Evidence-Based Management Implementation
Evidence-based management success not only requires managers to overcome
barriers, but managers and leaders must also engage in some proactive ventures. Studies
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showed successful evidence-based management implementations had managers or
leaders that took the current empirical research and adapted the findings to their unique
situation (Glaub et al., 2014; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 2016). The studies
also highlighted the need for stakeholder engagement (Russell, 2012; Spiri & MacPhee,
2013). Another factor studies considered was the impact of accreditation as a positive
modifier for evidence-based management success (Clawson et al., 1998; Olola et al.,
2016; Spector et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013). The next section will discuss some
of the factors identified within the available research literature that may facilitate
successful evidence-based management implementation.
Local adaptation. Evidence-based management theory encourages managers
and leaders to close the research –practice gap (Rousseau, 2006), yet the research may
not directly align to the current local context or problem set (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe,
2016; Briner & Walshe, 2014; Guo et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013). Lack of
research skills was previously identified as a barrier for managers (Briner & Walshe,
2014; Guo et al., 2015), but sometimes the relevant research either does not exist (Bartlett
& Francis-Smythe, 2016) or time constraints prevent its discovery (Telep & Lum, 2014).
Sometimes the available research in a given field, such as law enforcement, was so
overwhelming leaders had difficulty sorting through the findings and appropriately
applying the research to their local context (Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Telep & Lum,
2014).
Across different continents, cultures, languages, and scholarly disciplines, study
findings highlighted the importance of local adaptation for evidence-based management.
Managers and leaders who translated the best available research to their situation
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perceived a greater sense of self-efficacy and confidence in their approach to evidencebased management implementation (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Walker et al.,
2015; Wright et al., 2016). A senior nurse administrator in Brazil described “what
facilitates the management process is to relate scientific evidence with the institutional
reality” (Spiri & MacPhee, 2013, p. 268). More recently, Walker et al. (2015) Native
American participants specifically cited “flexibility for individual adaptation was the
most viable strategy” for evidence-based implementation success (p. 34).
Likewise, according to one United Kingdom organizational psychologist
participant “what occupational psychologists get is really good quality supervision so that
they understand this whole, how you do evidence-based practice in situ” (Bartlett &
Francis-Smythe, 2016, p. 624). More explicitly, the primary subject of the Wright et al.
(2016) study, Dr. Clancy, stated “I was also quick to acknowledge the fact that I had
adapted a lot of other people’s ideas just to develop an understanding of why it hadn’t
worked the first time.” (p.166). Adaptability consistently emerged as a major theme for
the studies above, leading researchers to surmise local adaptation was a major factor in
evidence-based management success.
Key stakeholder engagement. Evidence-based management theory explicitly
identifies key stakeholder participation as a major component for success (Rousseau,
2006; Rousseau & Olivas-Luján, 2013; Minjina, 2015). Researchers found leaders and
managers who actively engage key stakeholders within the organization may have a
better chance at successfully implementing organizational changes (Armstrong, 2012;
Gloppen et al., 2016; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Telep & Lum, 2014; Walker et al., 2015;
Wright et al., 2016). Whether engaging senior leadership or building impetus from the
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ground up, studies showed garnering support was a necessary process for evidence-based
implementation, especially when overcoming, or more pronouncedly failing to overcome,
resistance to change (Russell, 2012; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 2016). The
next section will briefly cover engagement of employees who are expected to perform the
changes and senior leaders who make decisions regarding organizational change.
Leaders need followers; otherwise they are not leaders but lone actors with a
message no one is listening to. Studies specifically distinguished the importance of
engaging and educating front line personnel in order to implement evidence-based
management decisions including but not limited to: law enforcement officers (Armstrong,
2012; Telep & Lum, 2014), social workers (Taylor & Campbell, 2011), medical
professionals (Russell, 2012; Spector et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al.,
2016), call center employees (Bhave, 2014), and more specifically tailored to the PSAP
community, telecommunicators (Clawson et al., 1998; Olola et al., 2016; Weiser et al.,
2013). In their rich depiction of evidence-based management in action, Wright et al.
(2016) offered multiple participant examples of stakeholder engagement including
accounts such as: “Clancy didn’t just come to us with an idea. He came to us with an idea
and all the data that supported it.” and “Clancy had the input of nursing staff and had to
engage them because it made a difference to how they practised” (p. 166). In this way,
those impacted by evidence-based management have the power to accept or sometime
subvert (Russell, 2012) the process.
Just as important as followers, if senior leadership does not trust the messenger or
is not convinced of the cost-benefit argument, both internal and external advocates will
not receive the approval to move forward (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Crowley et

46

al., 2012; Gloppen et al., 2016; Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Telep & Lum, 2014; Walker et
al., 2015). As previously discussed, senior leadership can either act as a hindrance
(Russell, 2012; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013) or a facilitator (Glaub et al., 2014; Telep & Lum,
2014) for evidence-based management. The research literature indicated senior
leadership may be more neutral in their views of evidence-based management than
particularly skewed either positively or negatively (Crowley et al., 2012; Gloppen et al.,
2016; Guo et al., 2015), however such conclusions require additional studies into the
baseline or pre-implementation viewpoint of senior leaders without the potential conflict
of promoting a particular program.
Accreditation as a moderator. As previously discussed at length, PSAP
accreditation seemed to positively moderate acceptance or implementation of evidencebased management (Clawson et al., 2016; Dornseif et al., 2016; Sebresos et al., 2016;
Shah et al., 2003; Weiser et al., 2013). Studies from other fields also suggested the
importance of accreditation or membership in a professional association (Armstrong,
2012; Spector et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Taylor & Campbell, 2011). One of
the most explicit, non-PSAP, contributions came from Spiri and MacPhee (2013) whose
study specifically evaluated the impact of accreditation on evidence-based management
implementation among hospitals in Brazil. More specifically, a senior nurse participant
stated:
EBP [evidence-based practice] is facilitated within an accredited institution
because of the accreditation process—this means that leaders must seek new
knowledge and collaborate with professionals, such as multidisciplinary team
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interactions, to address policy related to patient safety care. (Spiri & MacPhee,
2013, p. 269)
Research to date has not identified accreditation as an indicator or prerequisite of
evidence-based management, but research appeared to support accreditation as a positive
moderator.
Methodological Review
The literature reviewed was overwhelmingly quantitative, nearly two to one,
which is not surprising given the influence of empiricist and positivist paradigms on
evidence-based management theory that both proponents and critics agree on (Kepes et
al., 2014; Morrell et al., 2015; Rousseau & Olivas-Luján, 2013). The quantitative studies
focused largely on the effectiveness of a given evidence-based approach, such as the
Clawson et al. (1998) germinal study, or the depth of evidence-based understanding
among their studied populations, such as Taylor and Campbell (2011) and Telep and Lum
(2014). Complementarily, the qualitative and mixed method studies, particularly those of
Bartlett and Francis-Smythe (2016), Spiri and MacPhee (2013), and Wright et al. (2016),
provided rich insights into both barriers and factors of evidence-based management
implementation using the words of their participants. The next sections will briefly
describe the strategies of inquiry used by researchers within their chosen methodologies
and analyze their contribution to the overall understanding of evidence-based
management implementation.
Quantitative strategies of inquiry. As stated above, a majority of the reviewed
studies utilized quantitative methodologies to answer their research questions.
Hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of specific evidence-based practices were tested
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primarily using either correlations (Bhave, 2014; Clawson et al., 2016; Shah et al., 2003;
Spector et al., 2015) or comparisons of means after experimental interventions (Clawson
et al., 1998; Glaub et al., 2014; Gloppen et al., 2016; Olola et al., 2016). The randomized
studies performed by Glaub et al. (2014), and Gloppen et al. (2016) deserve greater
emphasis as they specifically showed positive results, thus establishing cause and effect,
due to evidence-based management interventions. Although discussed later in the mixed
method section below, the quantitative portion of the Crowley et al. (2012) study also
used randomized test and control communities to highlight the significant differences
between communities using evidence-based management and those which did not. For
proponents of evidence-based management theory, randomized experiments represent the
gold standard of evidence for managers to use when making decisions. A concrete
example of this positivist pyramid of evidence can be found in Kepes et al. (2014, p.
454).
To a lesser extent, researchers tested hypothesis, specifically those concerned with
telecommunicator processing times, with median tests (Dornseif et al., 2016; Weiser et
al., 2013). Prevalence studies categorized qualitative survey responses regarding
perceptions of evidence-based management into quantifiable metrics focused on topics
such as types of evidence and barriers (Guo et al., 2015), training techniques (Sebresos et
al., 2016), or receptivity of first-line practitioners (Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Telep &
Lum, 2014). Overall the literature was well balanced across quantitative strategies of
inquiry.
Qualitative strategies of inquiry. Interestingly, the most convincing evidence
regarding how evidence-based management implementation developed within observed
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contexts came from qualitative studies. Spiri and MacPhee, (2013) cited Brazilian
phenomenologist Martins’ (1992) coding approach with “three main research
components: description, reduction, and comprehension” to assign “units of meaning to
subthemes and themes” (p. 267). Although the only phenomenological study reviewed, it
contained some of the richest content among the purely qualitative studies. Case studies
represented about half of the qualitative strategies of inquires reviewed (Briner &
Walshe, 2014; Russell, 2012; Shuler & Sypher, 2000), with Wright et al. (2016)
deserving special mention for its detailed description of cross-checking informants,
triangulation using archival documents, and the multiple iterative waves of open coding
followed by recoding “related to the importance of a ‘fit’ between the organizational
context of the decision process and the decision-maker’s personal characteristics” (p.
165). Finally, grounded theory accounted for half of the strategies of inquiry used
(Armstrong, 2012; Walker et al., 2015) when also including the qualitative portions of the
mixed method studies discussed in the next section. While Armstrong (2012) provided
no insight into how analysis was performed, Walker et al. (2015) described in great detail
how researchers utilized both open and axial coding followed by participant review for
accuracy.
Mixed method strategies of inquiry. As previously discussed, the qualitative
portions of both mixed method studies utilized grounded theory as the chosen strategy of
inquiry but differed in both the order of when quantitative analysis was applied and what
quantitative strategies were used. Crowley et al. (2012) performed the qualitative
analysis to establish four quantifiable domains for further multi-level ANOVA means
testing between randomized control and test communities. Conversely, Bartlett and
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Francis-Smythe (2016) performed the quantitative prevalence survey analysis regarding
types of evidence used, then interviewed participants for further clarification and
exploration on codes initially developed form the survey data. After interviews, Bartlett
and Francis-Smythe, (2016) described an exhaustive and methodologically rigorous
coding process to develop three abstract “parent nodes” (p. 619). Both studies provided
detailed accounts of their analysis processes and interrater reliability, and both
contributed significant findings as part of this review.
Substantive Gaps and Recommendations for Further Research
There is a paucity of empirical research on evidence-based management
implementation which is one of the few areas where proponents (Kepes et al., 2014;
Minjina, 2015), critics (Morrell et al., 2015), and researchers (Glaub et al., 2014; Spiri &
MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 2016) agree. A majority of empirical studies focus
primarily on the effectiveness of a particular evidence-based practice making it difficult
for researchers to locate and find literature directly related to evidence-based
management decisions. The linkage between practice and decision-making may be
partially documented by the literature, but the linkage is rarely studied independently
causing researchers to sift through haystacks of evidence-based studies in the hopes of
finding the needles that describe evidence-based management decision-making processes.
PSAPs as a population for evidence-based practice and management.
Funneling further down into the narrower, yet multidisciplinary, field of PSAPs and the
overall 9-1-1 community, there are even less empirical studies related to evidence-based
management decision making (Gardett et al., 2016). Again, most empirical studies
discuss the effectiveness evidence-based practices such as telephonic cardiopulmonary
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resuscitation (Sasson et al., 2013; Sutter et al., 2015), medical protocols (Clawson et al.,
2016; Shah et al., 2003; Weiser et al., 2013), fire sciences (Dornseif et al., 2016), or
information technology usage (Athey & Stern, 2002). Diving even narrower and deeper,
there is one study related to quality improvement programs in a PSAP environment that is
nearly 20 years old (Clawson et al., 1998). Confounding efforts to locate relevant
research is the fact that “quality of service” is a PSAP specific technological term that has
nothing to do with quality improvement.
PSAP leaders’ perceptions of evidence-based quality improvement. Finally,
there is no research into how PSAP leaders make decisions related to evidence-based
practices. The closest corollary is the Sutter et al. (2015) national survey which studied
the prevalence of one evidence-based practice with no details on the decision-making
processes behind the use of such practice. Extant qualitative research seemingly centers
on front line telecommunicators such as Tracy and Tracy’s (1998) case study of three rare
instances of open rudeness, or Shuler & Sypher’s (2000) case study regarding
telecommunicators as emotional laborers. Studying PSAP leaders as participants and
their views on evidence-based management decisions regarding quality improvement
adds to the current dearth of knowledge.

Literature Review Summary
Evidence-based management theory may offer potential solutions to PSAP quality
inconsistencies and inform further research related to development of national standards
of care. The current quantitative and mixed methods literature supports evidence-based
management proponents’ claims that better evidence leads to better decision making and
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programmatic outcomes with some studies using the positivist gold standard of
randomized, longitudinal trials (Crowley et al., 2012; Glaub et al., 2014). Other
qualitative literature discusses practitioner (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016), first-line
supervisor (Armstrong, 2012), and limited leadership (Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Walker et
al., 2015) views on evidence-based practice or the decision-making processes
surrounding adoption of evidence-based practice.
This dissertation study closes a research gap by targeting PSAP leaders’
perceptions, specifically those leading designated wireless PSAPs in New York State
(NYS), regarding the primary question: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders support
effective implementations of quality care? Four subordinate research questions further
refine specific elements of the primary question, specifically: (a) How do PSAP leaders
measure performance based on their definition of quality? (b) How do PSAP leaders
perceive factors related to quality improvement? (c) When do PSAP leaders believe
evidence-based management theoretical frameworks, such as national standards of care,
should supersede local and personal experience frameworks; when do they not? (d) How
do PSAP leaders’ views align with evidence-based management theory? The study
performed guided discussions with focus groups consisting of former and existing
wireless NYS PSAP leaders followed by directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon,
2005) to answer these research questions as discussed fully in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: Research Design Methodology
Introduction
In Chapters 1 and 2, research and experience showed the quality of 9-1-1 services
can mean the difference between life and death (APCO, 2013a; DeLong v. County of
Erie, 1982). APCO (2015) along with other nationally recognized 9-1-1 organizations
created a minimum standard for PSAP comprehensive quality improvement programs,
yet there is no mandate for PSAPs to adopt such a standard (USDOT, 2013). This study
specifically focuses on quality improvement perceptions among New York State (NYS)
wireless PSAP leaders from an evidence-based management theoretical framework. This
study uses a qualitative method of inquiry called directed content analysis (Jiggins
Colorafi & Evans, 2016; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The next few sections will briefly
review elements from Chapters 1 and 2 relevant to the methodology before delving into a
more detailed description of the study.
General Perspective
With the advent of the 2015 standard, PSAP leaders must evaluate which
standards to adopt or even mandate by law. As stated in previous chapters, the evidence
decision makers use to justify policy becomes critical to the success or failure of such
policies. Evidence-based management is “the basing of managerial decisions on the best
available evidence” (Robbins & Judge, 2017, p. 11). Some empirical studies show
evidence-based management processes may improve the quality of care provided by
PSAPs in the areas of medical protocols (Clawson et al., 2016), quality improvement
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programs (Bhave, 2014), research knowledge (Olola et al., 2016), and community
leadership knowledge of evidence-based practices (Gloppen et al., 2016). Yet critics
warn that overreliance on certain forms of evidence as a panacea may not be in the
public’s best interest (Boyes-Watson & Pranis, 2012; Morrell et al., 2015; Russell, 2012).
There is little empirical research on evidence-based management decision-making
(Wright et al., 2016), PSAP quality improvement (Clawson et al., 1998), or PSAP leaders
as a population. This study provides new insight into how PSAP leaders make decisions
regarding the quality of service they provide to the public. The study assists our
understanding of how evidence-based management theory (Rousseau, 2006) aligns with
PSAP leaders’ reality.
Problem Statement
The quality of service provided by PSAPs is inconsistent due to the lack of
mandatory standards of care at the national, state, and local levels (APCO, 2103b;
NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 2013). Public demands and duties placed on PSAPs have
grown due to technological changes, civil cases alleging negligence, and the emergence
of national recommended standards of care (APCO, 2013a; Clawson et al., 2012; DeLong
v. County of Erie, 1982), yet governments at all levels have been slow to create
governance structures to reinforce adherence to standards (NHTSA, 2013; USDOT,
2013). Despite 9-1-1 being established as the national emergency number in 1999
(Hevesi, 2004), states and local municipalities provide most of the funding and oversight
to PSAP operations (NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 2013). States regulated local surcharges,
excise taxes, or universal service fund revenues, but most state laws “stop short of
addressing the full operational scope of 9-1-1 service” such as minimum training
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standards, staffing, quality improvement, or other best practices (NHTSA, 2013, p. 14).
This study offers possible solutions to governments regarding which standards of care
should be adopted, what measures best define quality, and what factors including staffing
and funding may be necessary for success.
Research Context
There are currently 6,359 primary PSAPs in the United States of which 191
primary PSAPs operate in the State of New York (FCC, July 31, 2017). Most of the
PSAPs operating in NYS are locally operated and controlled, however NYS established
laws governing local and state surcharges as early as 1989 (Hevesi, 2004). In 2002, NYS
updated surcharge laws and established a statewide governance board to develop
“minimum standards for public safety answering points” (Hevesi, 2004, p. 3).
The NYS minimum standards only apply to those PSAPs receiving wireless
surcharge funds. Recently, NY Statewide Interoperability and Emergency
Communications Board members stipulated the standards should apply to all PSAPs to
ensure a minimum quality of service throughout the state (New York State Department of
Homeland Security and Emergency Services [NYSDHSES], 2015; NYSDHSES, 2016).
Currently, only 56 county PSAPs (excluding the City of New York) accept wireless 9-1-1
surcharges and are therefore required to meet the minimum adopted standards
(NYSDHSES, in press). While the NYS adopted minimum standards address matters
such as wireless 9-1-1 equipment capabilities, staffing, and training, there are no
standards governing NYS PSAP quality improvement programs (21 NYCRR § 5200
n.d.).
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The advent of the APCO (2015) national standard has the potential to alter which
quality improvement standards are adopted, which PSAPs must follow those standards,
what funding mechanisms will be in place to support PSAP quality improvement, and
how NYS PSAPs operate in the future. Since New York is a large state and one of the
few states to adopt minimum 9-1-1 standards (USDOT, 2013), understanding how NYS
handles these questions may provide guidance to the nation as a whole. To gain insight
on these potential changes, the study elicited former and current NYS wireless PSAP
leaders’ perceptions regarding quality improvement.
Research Questions
This study explores how NYS wireless PSAP leaders evaluated the quality of
service PSAP employees provide to the public, what forms of evidence they used to
justify their quality improvement programs, and whether existing national standards of
care impacted their programmatic decisions. The study also identifies what PSAP leaders
perceive as barriers to achieving quality and what factors they believe contribute to
quality. Finally, the study analyzes and discusses the rich content provided by PSAP
leaders on these topics with regard to evidence-based management and evidence-based
practices.
As characterized in Chapter 1, the study addresses the primary research question:
How do NYS Wireless PSAP leaders support effective implementation of quality care?
Four subordinate questions provide insights into PSAP leader perceptions regarding the
primary question. (a) How do PSAP leaders measure performance based on their
definition of quality? (b) How do PSAP leaders perceive factors related to quality
improvement? (c) When do PSAP leaders believe evidence-based management
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theoretical frameworks, such as national standards of care, should supersede local and
personal experience frameworks; when do they not? (d) How do PSAP leaders’ views
align with evidence-based management theory?
Research Design Based on Focus Groups
The study used a qualitative method of inquiry called directed content analysis
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 2016). The study purposefully
sampled former and existing NYS wireless PSAP leaders as participants (Creswell &
Poth, 2018; Hickey & Kipping, 1996). Participants were invited to focus groups and
semi-structured interviews were conducted for data collection (Jiggins Colorafi & Evans,
2016; Moretti et al., 2011). Following data collection, the researcher performed directed
content analysis of the interview narratives. The analysis employed a priori coding
schema (see Appendix B) for alignment with evidence-based management theory
regarding quality improvement while allowing for new codes or themes to emerge as part
of the iterative process (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999).
This qualitative methodology has its roots in a deductive form of content analysis
where existing theory is used to inform the interview questions followed by a data
analysis process to test theory assumptions (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine‐
Donnerstein, 1999). While other qualitative designs such as grounded theory or inductive
content analysis may also help inform the answers to the research questions (Creswell &
Poth 2018; Sandelowski, 2002), the presence of an existing theory, evidence-based
management, assisted in creating a priori codes to inform the process (Hsieh & Shannon,
2005; Potter & Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999).
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The selection of this methodological research design does have limitations.
Specifically, the existence of pre-determined codes may blind researchers from
identifying other emerging categories and themes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter &
Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999). Additionally, researchers may seek only to reinforce their
preconceived notions regarding the theory rather than look for disconcerting data (Hsieh
& Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999; Saldana, 2013). These limitations
are inherent within qualitative analysis (Hickey & Kipping, 1996) where the researcher is
the instrument (Creswell & Poth 2018; Saldana, 2013; Sandelowski, 2002). Yet,
evidence-based management theory suggests it is local leaders adapting research to their
individual context that closes the research-practice gap (Rousseau, 2006), and thus the
decision to use directed content analysis serves as the best fit to the proposed study.
Research Participants
The study purposefully sampled former and current PSAP leaders who were
employed at the designated wireless PSAPs for each of the 56 counties (excluding the
City of New York) within the State of New York. A purposive sample is a nonrepresentative subset of a larger population specifically chosen due to their unique
experiences or expertise on the study’s subject matter (Creswell & Poth, 2018). For the
purposes of this study, PSAP leaders were defined as individuals whose job descriptions
included, but are not limited to, primary supervision of all PSAP personnel; development
and implementation of PSAP policies and procedures; PSAP staffing and scheduling;
PSAP training or quality improvement; and PSAP budgeting. To ensure a breadth of
ideas and experience throughout NYS, only one participant from each county was invited
to each of the focus group sessions. This prevented a single agency with multiple PSAP
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leaders from dominating the sessions, or worse, suppressing participation in focus group
discussions due to internal agency relationships (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Esterberg,
2002). Since multiple members from one county may potentially be identified as PSAP
leaders, a review of publicly available job descriptions using county human resource
websites determined which employee best fit the study definition of a PSAP leader. The
researcher is a member of the NYS 911 Coordinators Association, a professional nonprofit organization. The researcher provided a brief presentation of the study at one of
the semiannual 911 Coordinators Association conferences to encourage interest in the
study.
Recruitment Procedure
Following St. John Fisher Institutional Review Board approval, the researcher
generated a list of potential participants from the publicly available member list on the
association website. As stated above, a review of job descriptions determined which
employee from each county was invited to the focus group sessions. A list of alternate
names was also created in case participation attrition exceeds initial expectations or if a
PSAP leader elects to send an alternate due to PSAP operational considerations
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Moretti et al., 2011; Saldana, 2013).
The researcher used existing PSAP leader contacts through the association to set
up geographically convenient host sites to conduct the focus group sessions. The
researcher contacted potential applicants via e-mail and phone to determine their initial
interest in the study. Once participants expressed initial interest in the study, the
researcher coordinated the best location, dates, and times to conduct the focus group
sessions. Participants were sent electronic calendar invitations to attend sessions based
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on their geography and previously indicated availability. Since the researcher is also a
PSAP leader, the researcher’s county was not invited to the focus group sessions for
ethical reasons.
Four sessions consisting of three participants each were conducted for a total of
12 participants. The overall intent of the study was to interview between 10 to 12 total
participants or until data saturation is reached (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Esterberg,
2002). At least four to six participants were invited to each focus group with the
anticipation of having three to five attend each session and allowing for attrition
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Moretti et al., 2011; Saldana, 2013). Hosting four focus
group sessions on different dates at regionally based locations provided participants
multiple opportunities to attend interviews based on their individual schedules and
proximity to host sites (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Saldana, 2013).
Upon arrival, each participant was provided an informed consent form approved
by the St. John Fisher Institutional Review Board (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Creswell
& Poth, 2018). After participants consented, they were permitted to attend the focus
group session. The next three sections: Instrumentation, Data Collection, and Data
Analysis Focus will discuss the remainder of the procedure.
Instrumentation Procedure
The researcher conducted focus group interviews using a semi-structured
interview format. The researcher asked open-ended questions developed to answer the
research questions and ensure the purpose of the focus group is fulfilled (Charmaz,
2002). Pilot testing of the questions was conducted with the first of four focus groups
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015). Questions were divided into three major categories: main
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questions directly related to the research questions; probing questions designed to elicit
more detail; and cross-talk questions designed to encourage alternate opinions or greater
participation (Charmaz, 2002).
Main questions. There were six main questions designed to specifically answer
the study research questions. The main questions begin with the phrase “Please give me
an example or describe a time . . . ”
1A. That you knew you did a good job.
•

How did you know?

•

How should performance be measured?

1B. That things did not go correctly, in terms of performance.
•

What went wrong?

•

What came as a result?

Interview questions 1A and 1B were designed to answer research sub-question 1 by
eliciting operationalized definitions of quality and how PSAP leaders measure quality.
2A. That you tried to implement a change in standards or procedure and were
successful.
•

What made you try to implement the change?

•

What made you determine which standards / procedure to follow?

2B. That you tried to implement a change in standards or procedure and failed.
•

What do you think contributed to the failure?

The PSAP leader answers to interview questions 2A and 2B directly related to participant
perceptions regarding quality improvement factors from research sub-question 2.
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3A. When you know that following certain standards or procedures ensured better
quality care.
•

What were the standards and how did you know it was “better”?

3B. When you think following certain standards or procedures do not help, and
may cause problems.
•

What are the standards or procedures?

•

Why do you think following them may have been problematic?

Interview questions 3A and 3B were designed for participant reflection on standards
development and validity in relation to sub-question 3.
PSAP leader discussions and examples provided in reply to the six main questions
informed research question 4 regarding alignment to current evidence-based management
theory. The use of the a priori codebook allowed the researcher to evaluate if topics
previously identified in the literature were appearing in participant discussions. While
the answers to the six main questions provided generally sufficient information related to
research sub-question 4, the following interview questions were used to elicit more direct
responses:
4A. How do you know standards are good and effective?
•

What should be the minimum standards of care?

•

What is the best way to improve?

4B. What is your view of evidence-based standards or procedures?
•

What are the pros and cons?

•

Can you ever over-rely on evidence-based management?
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Probing and cross talk. During the focus group discussions, additional
information or topics were introduced but not fully explored by the participants. Probes
such as silence, clarifying, validating, or seeking meaning prompted deeper discussion
that was both relevant to the conversation and necessary to answer the research question
(Charmaz, 2002; Saldana, 2013). As stated above, cross talk within focus groups is
critical to uncovering minority opinions or encouraging full participation, therefore the
researcher encouraged cross talk or specifically called upon less active participants to
ensure multiple viewpoints were discussed (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015).
Bracketing. The researcher’s professional position provides both access and an
immediate familiarity with the social, political, and professional contexts of the study.
However, the researcher was very cognizant to approach focus group interviews and
follow-on analysis with a deliberate naiveté (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015). Deliberate
naiveté allows the researcher to exhibit “openness to new and unexpected phenomena . .
. and a bracketing of presuppositions” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, pp. 33-34).
Data Collection Procedure
Each focus group session last approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes each and
commenced with an opening statement (see Appendix C). Participants were placed in an
open circle or around a table (depending on host facilities) to facilitate cross discussion
among participants. The researcher allowed willing participants to maintain the session
for a longer period than the originally intended hour session. Interviews were audio and
video recorded ensuring verbal and non-verbal communications were captured
(Sandelowski, 2002). Field notes describing location characteristics, interpersonal
exchanges, and “gut” feelings were also recorded (Sandelowski, 2002). Participants
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completed a short organizational form (Appendix D) at the end of each session. The
form was not used for this study but will serve as a pilot test for follow-on quantitative
prevalence surveys. As a thank you, participants were provided a meal or gift cards
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015).
Data Analysis Procedure
Interviews were transcribed and entered via rich text format into a coding
software database for analysis. Video recordings were utilized during the transcription
process to properly identify speakers and serve as a backup to audio recordings. All data
and backups were stored on password protected drives and maintained solely by the
researcher after transcription. Video recordings were not specifically coded but were
used as a reference by the researcher to determine the level of agreement with a speaker
or for triangulation of data (Moretti et al., 2011).
The researcher was the lens through which the collected data is interpreted
(Creswell & Poth 2018; Hickey & Kipping, 1996; Saldana, 2013; Sandelowski, 2010).
Bracketing was essential during both the data collection and analysis processes since an a
priori codebook will exist, thus introducing a preexisting mindset to interpreting the data
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Saldana, 2013). Member checking transcripts and triangulating
using information from multiple participants helped the researcher determine the true
intent behind texts (Saldana, 2013). Analytic memos, detailing the researcher’s decision
processes behind coding served as reflective guideposts during the iterative cycles of
coding (Esterberg, 2002; Hickey & Kipping, 1996; Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 2016;
Saldana, 2013; Sandelowski, 2010). Analytic memos also helped the researcher
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determine whether coding will “attend to the surface of words, or, read into, between, and
over the lines” (Sandelowski, 2002, p. 107).
As previously noted, the directed content analysis approach utilized a priori codes
as identified by preexisting research and literature from an evidence-based management
theoretical framework (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 2016; Potter
& Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999).

Specifically, the multi-step process as identified in

Jiggins Colorafi and Evans (2016) was used with adaptations for electronic versus
manual coding. The iterative process allowed for both alignment with preexisting
categories and the emergence of additional categories. As codes coalesced into
categories, analysis developed more abstract forms of broader categories resulting in
overall themes aimed at answering the research questions (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005;
Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 2016). A summarized list of the steps from Jiggins Colorafi
and Evans (2016) is below:
1. Create an a priori coding manual derived from the theoretical framework and
literature before data collection, organized by domains or thematic groupings.
2. Transcribe the interview texts and document pre-analytic remarks in memos.
3. Perform first level coding by dividing sentences or paragraphs into meaning
units. First level codes are gerund verbs with an “ing” ending to “denote
action” (p. 21).
4. Similar codes organized into more abstract categories.
5. Pattern codes revised and redefined, exemplars used for clarification.
6. Revisit analytical memos to aid data reduction into more concise conceptual
clusters.

66

7. Data displays or visual representations are created to assist organization,
categorization, and triangulation of data.
8. Data is re-presented after analysis to fit the findings.
Validity
For qualitative methods of inquiry, validity is not a statistical term but rather a
measure of “trustworthiness and authenticity” (Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 2016, p.23).
The validity of the data and subsequent analysis heavily depends on the primary
instrument, the researcher (Hickey & Kipping, 1996; Saldana, 2013). Although
instrumentation threats and mitigations have been discussed previously, it also important
to note the participants may also introduce threats to the study’s validity by not being
truthful, seeking to please the researcher, or suppressing the opinions of others
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2013). Member checking transcripts after the focus group sessions
served as one mitigation to these threats (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2013). Triangulation of
data across multiple sessions served as another mitigation for participant threats to
validity, provided the researcher ensured disparate or non-conforming perceptions
emerge during analysis (Saldana, 2013).
Research Methods Summary
Developing standards of care within PSAPs may improve quality for all users.
Directed content analysis used a priori theory-based codes to evaluate NYS PSAP leader
perceptions of evidence-based standards. Local PSAP leaders at NYS county wireless
centers were a purposive, non-representative, sample of subject matter experts. PSAP
leader focus groups with open-ended semi-structured interview questions served as the
primary data collection method. Following directed content analysis, the resulting NYS
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PSAP leaders’ perceptions identified quality improvement obstacles and accelerators for
consideration as the NYS PSAP community makes critical decisions regarding future
funding and policy.
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Chapter 4: Results
Research Questions
This study addressed the following research question: How do NYS wireless
PSAP leaders support effective implementation of quality care? Four sub-questions were
used to elicit PSAP leader perceptions regarding the primary question. (a) How do PSAP
leaders measure performance based on their definition of quality? (b) How do PSAP
leaders perceive factors related to quality improvement? (c) When do PSAP leaders
believe evidence-based management theoretical frameworks, such as national standards
of care, should supersede local and personal experience frameworks; when do they not?
(d) How do PSAP leaders’ views align with evidence-based management theory?
Methodological Overview
There are currently 56 county-designated wireless PSAPs in the State of New
York. Twelve PSAP leaders (three former and nine current) participated in four focus
group sessions of three persons each to discuss how they supported effective
implementation of quality. PSAP leaders answered open ended questions regarding the
four subordinate questions previously described in Chapter 3. Participants engaged in
discussions averaging 90 minutes in length. Participants provided pseudonyms to protect
their confidentiality.
Interviews were coded using a priori codes based on existing evidence-based
management literature regarding standards implementation. Unless otherwise noted,
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italicized text represented the original emphasis of the participant. In the following
sections, there is a brief introduction of the responses to the four sub-questions. Results
are then presented in greater detail in segments organized by theme.
PSAP Leaders Defining and Measuring Quality
When questioned about how they defined or measured quality in response to subquestion 1: “How do PSAP leaders measure performance based on their definition of
quality?”, PSAP leaders often referenced standards or protocols. PSAP leaders wanted to
understand or evaluate the purpose of a standard before implementation. One quote from
Cliff, a former PSAP leader, set the tone of the entire study: “I don't necessarily know
that procedures or standards that exist outside your agency are bad or good, right? It's
how and why you chose to implement them” (1:142). Said slightly differently by the
same participant, “The best way to improve is to always be: ‘What are we trying to
accomplish?’ ‘What tools do we have in our toolbox today to do this job better than we
did it yesterday?’” (1:153). As we discussed each of the sub-questions, PSAP leaders
described how they tried to improve the standards of care they provide.
PSAP leaders were consistently concerned with both the accuracy and speed at
which telecommunicators (sometimes referred to as dispatchers or call takers by
participants) gathered and retransmitted information to responders. While there was
general agreement about quality expectations, the application or measurement of those
quality expectations was inconsistent across sessions. Participants regularly referenced
feedback from senior leaders, responders, coworkers, and callers when discussing quality
measures. PSAP leaders stated reviews of calls, radio transmissions, and data entry logs
were important, however inconsistencies were impacted by staffing as discussed in
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greater detail in sub-question 2. In the next sections, the themes which emerged in
response to sub-question 1 are described in greater detail.
“Fast, accurate.” PSAP leaders described that they measure quality using two
criteria, speed and accuracy, which are sometimes in conflict with each other. Cliff
stated, “What's the minimum standard of care? In the 911 world, the specific [policy] is
up to the agency, but it really boils down to two things: fast, accurate” (1:15). Ensuring
help arrives to the correct location without delay during emergencies was important to
participants, especially during high call volumes. This can cause some tension for PSAP
telecommunicators because often PSAP have multiple emergencies occurring at the same
time. In a different session, Siobhan, a current female PSAP leader from a large agency,
relayed her response to a complaining citizen who felt the telecommunicator took too
long to handle the citizen’s request, “She got her help as quickly as she could, so she
could go on to the next [9-1-1] call.” (2:109). Another participant from a large PSAP,
Byron, described how he felt PSAPs performance should be measured:
How should a PSAP's performance be measured? By efficiency, professionalism,
the ability to get the job entered quickly, dispatched quickly. Mitigate problems
that we can for the road [law enforcement patrol cars], so that as things are
developing, we're already on top of fill-ins [fire department requests for additional
apparatus], and staging [location for equipment waiting to respond]. (3:6)
Participants regularly referenced “times” when defining quality whether it was “time to
dispatch” (time it takes from the initial 9-1-1 call to the dispatching of emergency
responders), “arrival time” (time from dispatch to responders arriving on-scene of an
incident), or even a “20-minute timer” for fire responses. Danisha who currently leads
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her small PSAP stated, “I knew they did a good job based on the timeline” (4:1).
Danisha then described the complexities of 9-1-1 calls, discussed in another segment.
Equally, PSAP leaders wanted to avoid delays in the process caused by
telecommunicator errors. Participants focused on the accuracy of the information
telecommunicators were collecting such as the location of the incident and people
involved or how they made decisions based on that information. Lillian, another former
PSAP leader, told a story about a telecommunicator that forwarded a 9-1-1 call to the
incorrect agency, she recalled admonishing the telecommunicator:
Well, if you get them to the wrong dispatcher, you're not making it [the
emergency response to an incident] happen any faster, you're actually in fact
delaying the response rather than taking those few seconds to do it right. I used to
tell them it's not always good to do it quick, it's better to do it right. (1:56)
During an active shooter incident, another telecommunicator sent officers to the incorrect
location for a business that had two stores on the same road, miles apart. Siobhan
recounted how it impacted the call, “And she knew that she had messed up. And all the
officers were screaming, ‘It's not at this plaza!’ And then she was like, ‘Oh.’ And there
could've been like an 8-minute delay" (2:15). Siobhan later related how police officers
were passing by the active shooter scene on the way to the incorrect location putting both
responders and the public at risk. Larry, who recently retired from a medium sized PSAP
frankly stated, “Finding people is a critical part of the job” (1:30), establishing how
gathering accurate information was a standard measure of quality.
“It’s arbitrary.” When asked how PSAP leaders measured quality, the responses
were mixed with quality being based on general feedback in some agencies to formalized
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quality reviews with programmatic timelines. George, a longtime employee yet a
relatively new PSAP leader from a medium sized agency said, “To know whether they're
[agency policies] good and effective? It's your delivery to your customer, to your
customer base, I think. However, based on what your standards are, . . . it's all arbitrary”
(2:85). George went on to advocate that mandatory standards apply to all PSAPs within
NYS, as opposed to only county-designated wireless PSAPs, to combat the seemingly
arbitrary levels of quality provided by various PSAPs. This will be discussed later in this
chapter under NYS governance.
Other participants relayed how performance was difficult to measure; Danisha
specifically cited the complexity of telecommunicator’s jobs,
So, in regards to how should PSAP performance be measured? There's a lot of
different variables because there's a lot of times where there is a big incident and
they do an excellent job, but there might be 99 tasks that need to be done and one
of them was done incorrectly. For some reasons that's always the one highlighted.
So, I mean I measure it based on the big picture. I certainly don't pick out one or
two things that were done incorrectly if the other 88 [sic] were done right. It's a
good job. (4:2)
Another participant, Cliff, described how PSAP telecommunicators seem to shine during
stressful events, but fail to perform during routine calls “because they've done it 1,000
times. They're just rattling off the top of their head, not really following the protocol”
(1:18). This apparent lack of consistency, the inability to always measure quality, and the
skewed focus on Danisha’s “1 of 99” things done incorrectly frustrated participants.
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PSAP leaders believed the feedback was good, but the same feedback often discounted
the good jobs their employees do more often than not.
“Feedback.” Feedback was consistently cited by multiple participants across all
sessions as a primary means of determining the standard of care provided. Clark, a leader
of a medium sized PSAP, bluntly joked, “Well, tongue in cheek, I'll answer that. How do
we know our standards are good and effective? No one calls and bitches on Monday
morning about something that happened” (3:92).

Larry, a former PSAP leader, said,

I call it customer feedback. I mean we all have customers from the EMS side, the
fire side, and our police that “Oh my God, Wendy's working today? Oh God, she
drives me insane, right?” And we have the same customers go, “Man, when Mike,
or Joe's working, they always get it right, and they're professional.” (1:47)
Byron stated, “We are fortunate in that we do get feedback from our user agencies; we,
from time to time, will get feedback from citizens” (3:3).
In the same session, Monte, a female leader from a mid-sized PSAP, raised a
concern about feedback, “I just do not think performance should be measured by negative
feedback. I mean, often with the public, you don't get to hear a lot, unless you're sending
out surveys, or doing things like that” (3:8). Chris, a current leader of a large PSAP,
described how repeated errors, especially when they are the same errors, get the attention
of PSAP leaders, “Their name has passed across the desk [before] because you were
getting, ‘Yeah here's a potential liability because a call didn't go in. . . . Well this is the
third time I've seen this’” (4:34).
Feedback, whether it was positive or negative, was described as spurious, or in the
moment, by most participants. Clark explained,
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We're reliant on our supervisors to advise us about, "Hey, just so you know, on
the overnight shift we had this really good call. The dispatcher did this," or, "The
team did this." Or, we get an email, which is probably the lesser of the two
examples, from a fire chief, or a police officer, [or an] EMS provider saying,
"Hey, just so you guys know, or just so you know, your guys did a really good job
last night, day before yesterday." (3:1)
Some participants did have formal survey programs, but that was not common across all
sessions or participants. Going back to George, when discussing how his employees
received recognition based on feedback, “arbitrary” comes up again:
It's [measuring quality] an arbitrary thing. It’s not, I don't think it's set in stone, at
least in my center. Typically, it's . . . doing their job, you know. Delivering a
baby, technically, is doing their job. But that's a good thing. Doing the EMD
correctly and deliver, you know, childbirth, or a save [of a person’s life] or
something like that. (2:6)
Reviews. The combination of inconsistent (or arbitrary) feedback and expectations
that quality work is just “doing their job” often accompanied PSAP leaders’ advocacy for
formalized reviews, although many participants admitted they were not doing enough
reviews. Chris described how reviews are so important to both quality assurance and the
agency’s training program:
That's a measurement. Evaluation, employee evaluations. How are they doing
individually? The quality assurance reviews. How is each person doing, but that
also measures us as a PSAP and how are we doing overall in our training process?
[Trainees perform] reviews on our CTOs [Communications Training Officers]
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when [they] get done training and we review them. How have they done? And we
take those reviews. We review every class after we get done. “What are the good?
What's the bad? What do we need to make changes on?” (4:8)
While training is discussed later under sub-question 2 as an implementation factor, this
particular quotation reinforced the theme that formalized reviews were used as quality
measurements.
Having a formalized plan for reviews came up multiple times. Cliff stated, “Well
you really do need, and this is difficult in most people's instances [emphasis added], you
really do need a formalized plan of reviewing a certain number of calls” (1:43). Siobhan
discussed how her agency had a plan, but the agency’s goals were not always met:
We do a lot of QA/QI [quality assurance / quality improvement reviews] at my
place. Last year, we implemented, we were going to do 20 QA/QI per staff
member a month. And it's been working out fairly well. With all the training
we've been doing, we've had a hard time keeping that number. But we have done
at least 10 a month per person. But it's subjective. (2:91A)
Conversely, Cliff’s agency was able to reduce the on-air time (time spent talking
on the radio) for fire dispatches using reviews and reinforcement:
And eventually, with constant reinforcement, and constant review, and a little bit
of allowance for some flexibility . . . that [time spent transmitting information] got
down so that they [transmitted]: the fire department, type of call, address, very
short complaint [description of the emergency]. Done. (1:99)
Similarly, Byron expressed that formalized reviews help PSAP leaders catch performance
issues before they become problems,
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In our department, all employees get five call reviews a month, on top of their QI
reviews from the medical priorities [emergency medical dispatch review] folks.
So, you can see when somebody is not up to par and doing as they should be
doing. You can hear that. (3:12B -3:13B)
While acknowledging reviews were important, PSAP leaders also raised concerns
about inconsistencies across members of the quality improvement team during the
grading process. Siobhan stated,
Two of my people can listen to the exact same call, and we're going to have a
different outcome. Somebody's going to give them an A and somebody's going to
give them a D, just because they hear a little something different in the tone of the
voice. (2:91B)
Tyler, a current leader of a small PSAP, echoed those same concerns in a different
session, “It was a struggle because initially we didn't have all our graders being consistent
across the board. So, one guy would do it one way, one guy was doing it another way. . . .
That’s not objective” (4:105B – 4:106A). Despite these concerns, participants felt
reviews, even with inconsistences, were worthwhile, especially when trying to “catch”
her employees doing their job well. Returning to Siobhan:
So that's something that we're working on, but we do a lot of QA/QI at my place. I
think it's important. I think it's important not just to find the bad calls, but I want
to find those good calls, too. Or, I want to find those rare calls where maybe we
can learn something from it. So that's been pretty important to us. (2:91C)
Although participants judged reviews were critical to providing quality, they also
confessed that quality improvement reviews were not always their top priority. George
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expressed a common PSAP leader reality, “Unfortunately, QA/QI takes a back burner to
other projects” (2:90). When confronted with other priorities, PSAP leaders
acknowledged how reviewing calls requires a great deal of time and may lead to conflict
with employees depending on how the feedback is presented. These sentiments are
discussed in greater detail below which leads us directly into the next section covering
implementation factors.
PSAP Leaders’ Implementation Factors
Sub-question 2 asked: “How do PSAP leaders perceive factors related to quality
improvement?” Implementation factors centered primarily around achieving “buy-in”
from multiple stakeholders including senior leaders (internal and external), middle
managers, supervisors, and employees. Other factors included training, staffing, and
having time to perform QA/QI reviews of telephone calls, radio transmissions, and
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data entries. Finally, participants identified
accreditation as a positive reinforcement to standards adoption across all sessions despite
some of the participants’ agencies not being accredited. Below we will discuss each of
these themes in greater detail.
“Buy-in.” PSAP leaders are not always the chief executive of their organizations
but are often the primary person responsible for maintaining standards, implementing
new programs, and held responsible for the performance of PSAP telecommunicators.
PSAP leaders serve as brokers for multiple stakeholders from their internal senior
leadership, senior leaders of responder agencies, their employees, and the public. When
trying to implement standards of care, PSAP leaders described the requirement to get
“buy-in” from those multiple stakeholder groups. “Buy-in” was described by PSAP
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leaders as a neutral indicator, if the PSAP leader was able to achieve buy-in from their
stakeholders, the implementation succeeded. However, when PSAP leaders failed to
achieve buy-in, implementations either failed dramatically or slowly faded away.
Tyler described how a good standard failed to get implemented when the PSAP
leader does not get buy-in, “It was a great idea and I would have probably got full buy-in
except I approached it wrong” (4:61). Chris experienced the same phenomenon “There
was just some issues on the fire side we needed [to fix] and it really, it just failed. And I
think part of that was buy-in because we didn't get enough buy-in from the people that
were doing it” (4:59). Monte gives a vivid description of how a bad idea without buy-in
can create havoc in a PSAP:
There was no buy-in from the supervisors, the employees, from anybody, except
this [9-1-1 operations] board that supported this one person. . . . Well, just making
that little change made them [PSAP telecommunicators] feel like bumbling
baboons, and really made the field providers say, ‘What in the world is going on
up there?’ And there was no ability to explain. I mean, an email was sent out and
things like that, but it really was a failure. We went back [to the previous
procedure] pretty quickly, actually, because it was just crazy. (3:77)
Over the next few sub-sections we will discuss examples of both negative and positive
buy-in involving different stakeholder groups such as senior leaders, middle managers
and supervisors, employees, and finally from the PSAP leaders’ perspective of being a
trusted insider.
Buy-in involving senior leaders. As stated earlier, PSAP leaders are not always
the chief executive of their agency. PSAP leaders identified both internal and external
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senior leaders that needed to be convinced if they wanted to successfully implement
standards of care. When describing how his agency first implemented emergency
medical dispatch (EMD) protocols almost two decades earlier, Larry flatly stated “The
hard sell was the administrators” (1:76). EMD is an evidence-based process where
telecommunicators ask protocol-defined questions and provide medical interventions to
improve patient outcomes. The concept behind EMD was the idea that
telecommunicators were the “first” of the first responders by being “on scene” (although
remotely through the phone) before ambulances arrived. We will discuss PSAP leaders’
perceptions of EMD later during sub-question 3; however Larry’s depiction of senior
leaders’ perceptions demonstrated how he had to work through his supervisor’s ignorance
regarding the benefit of having telecommunicators give life-saving medical instructions
over the phone:
All that took a toll, and the administrators . . . said, "Why aren't we just sending
an ambulance?” . . . That was the mentality. . . . Our PSAP is controlled by a
sheriff's office. They're cops, they think like cops, they were trained as cops, they
came up through the ranks, and it's no bad reflection on them, it's just their
training and background was all law enforcement. They don't see the medical
side of it. (1:86B)
In the end, Larry did succeed in implementing the EMD program, along with its higher
standard of care, primarily because his senior leadership trusted his judgement as
addressed further on when we discuss PSAP leaders as trusted insiders.
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Participants described senior leaders as both supportive and destructive when
implementing evidence-based standards of care. As an example of being supportive,
George admired how his senior leadership created an environment that fosters quality:
Oh, it's huge as far as I'm concerned. I mean, I'm in a fortunate position . . . since
I've been in my current position, I have [had] a very progressive boss, that's
extremely supportive of the division. But I could see where if you had a
department head who was not in support of communications [PSAP
telecommunicators], that it could be very difficult. (2:83)
Siobhan echoed George’s sentiment, “My boss has been very good at pushing us forward,
pushing everyone forward, and getting our good name out there. So, I'm pretty lucky, and
he's really supportive of me” (2:84A). Likewise, Clark described the process he used to
convince members of his county legislative body to invest in additional staff to meet
standards of care,
Our [county] board of supervisors and our administration has been very
supportive. . . . But, what we had to do was literally bring them in. Bring in a
[county board] supervisor who may question what the need is and explain how
operations work. And show them that there literally is a need to have a supervisor
available when somebody snaps their fingers, activates their red light on their
consoles, which is basically [saying], “I need a supervisor. I need help." (3:60)
Tyler told how senior leaders led the change process from the top, laterally, and down the
hierarchical chain,
We worked a lot with Bureau of Fire and said okay, get them to buy into this and
they did presentations to our dispatchers. Then they went out and did all of the

81

fire departments and then they, came back to us and said, okay this is some of the
feedback from the fire departments, what's your feedback? And now our
dispatchers actually love it. There's no guesswork. (4:77)
Conversely, participants also described the destructive influence senior leaders
can have when they issue commands or initiate programs without engaging others.
Casper, a longtime PSAP leader of a small agency, describes how senior leaders can
overreact to bad incident, such as a fatal accident, by instituting a policy without
consulting a PSAP leader, “It wasn't like I had any input in it [the new policy]. It was
just, ‘Here it is!’ . . . What are we supposed to tell them [telecommunicators]? It just was
a poorly thought out edict” (2:48). Tyler illustrated how senior leaders can put PSAP
leaders in a difficult spot, “You have no control. . . you can't fully undermine that either
and go, ‘Well I don't agree with this!’ It doesn't matter whether we agree or not. The guy
who's writing your paycheck is . . . implementing it [the policy]” (4:83). Returning to
Monte’s example of not having buy-in, she depicted out how a senior leader initiated the
failed program described earlier “We were directed at a [9-1-1 advisory board] meeting . .
. to make that change right then” (3:76).
PSAP leaders described how both senior leaders and supervisors, according to
Lillian, are “the two biggest obstacles” to policy implementation (1:121). Cliff followed
up Lillian’s comment by describing how he as a PSAP leader got in his own way, “It's
related to senior leadership not having buy in. Sometimes you are the person who isn't
giving the buy in, right? Yourself, in person, in your own head” (1:122). Based on the
evidence above, failure to achieve buy-in from senior leaders or PSAP leaders themselves
often led to disastrous or ineffective implantations whereas successful implementations
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stemmed from convincing senior leaders that change is necessary. As noted above, a
PSAP leader may be a considered middle management depending on their placement on
the PSAP’s organizational chart. Next, we will discuss middle managers and supervisors.
Buy-in from middle managers and supervisors. PSAP leaders referenced the
importance of having middle managers and first-line supervisors buy-in to the logic
behind any evidence-based change. Like Cliff, Casper detailed how his people had to
convince him that an evidence-based standard, such as informing fire responders that 20
minutes had elapsed since the start of a fire, was necessary to implement,
I wasn't really too fond of it. It was keeping track of 20 minute from [the start of]
fires. And I didn't like it when it was first approached to me, because I felt that it
was one more thing being dumped onto us. . . . Other dispatchers, who were more
in favor of it, they finally kind of lured me to understand that it is our [PSAP
telecommunicators’] responsibility. (2:37)
Returning to Cliff, he related how his PSAP supervisors participated in selecting the
vendor for their agency’s EMD implementation “They were engaged, a couple of the
senior people [in the PSAP] were engaged in choosing the program between the
competitors at the time” (1:79). George described that he gets “buy-in and feedback from
other participants, minimally, [from] other supervision” (2:53). Similarly, Siobhan stated
that “I get a lot of feedback from my senior [telecommunicators]” before implementing
changes at her PSAP (2:56).
PSAP leaders also described how supervisors can stop evidence-based standards
of care before implementation can even occur. Monte told how her supervisors refused
to adopt new 9-1-1 call distribution policies and how she engaged them,
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The pushback has been unbelievable from the supervisors to the point where,
now, I'm having one-on-one meetings with them. Because as things get going
with any subgroup, whether it be a certain platoon or group of supervisors, or
things like that, they get talking amongst themselves and we have those who can
make things a lot worse, or a lot more dire sounding. (3:51)
Byron, however, received buy-in from his supervisors and saw success, “We vetted that.
We rolled it out to some of our key staff to take a look how they felt it was going to work.
We had folks that jumped in and started utilizing the change . . . very quickly” (3:68A).
Chris illustrated the dual nature of supervisors and how they can either kill or promote an
idea:
They're the ones working the [PSAP] operations floor and of course management
can't be out on the floor all the time . . . and you can't control them. You can think
you can control them and you can't. In reality, they're the ones that are going to
show and push for the better items that they're supportive of. They're gonna be
like, ‘Oh yeah, this is a great idea.’ They're gonna push it, they're gonna talk it up
and people are gonna see that and go, ‘Wow it must be good’. If it's something
negative and your supervisors are talking it down, you can control that as best as
you can, but sometimes you hear about it, sometimes you don't. People on the
floor are going to be negative too. And so, I think supervisor support is very
important. (4:55)
Danisha also revealed how getting buy-in from her supervisors was critical to success,
Well something happened with one policy that it just went awry and again I can't
think of the example. But what it led to was, any policies or procedures now go to
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the supervisors. They review them . . . because they're the ones doing the jobs, so
I could easily miss something. So, they come from admin, they go to supervisors,
they review them very thoroughly before they go to the [PSAP operations] floor
from now on. (4:63)
Clark described that he seeks input from both supervisors and informal leaders within his
PSAP:
You may have an idea, you may fashion something that you think is going to
work, and is going to streamline your process, but as the director, I'm not the
boots on the ground guy that's doing this every day. If I don't ask my staff, if I
don't roll it out to folks and we pick it apart, I don't know where the failures are
going to be. . . . We should trust our people to give us good feedback. We should
pick their brains. Because, that some folks have chosen not to become
supervisors, doesn't mean that they're not a key part of your operation. (3:71)
Clark’s depiction of how some employees are leaders within the center, without having a
supervisory title, leads us to the next group of stakeholders, the front-line employees.
Buy-in from employees. PSAP leaders were mixed on how they handled frontline staff although a majority of PSAP leaders expressed a desire to positively engage
their staff. Siobhan spoke flippantly when she described opposition at her PSAP,
The younger staff will do it, but the older staff will just whine and moan and
complain continuously. And it'll just bring down morale a little bit. But the
younger staff will do it. Over half my staff is new. So, I don't have a lot of trouble
like that. But the few that are there are the loudest. (2:46)
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Byron took the opposite approach “If you don't get buy-in from the folks that are going to
be doing this on a daily basis, you are not going to be successful, in my opinion” (3:70).
He went on to further explain, “Well, if you don't have an information exchange with
your staff . . . you are not going to get your troops behind you. It's simply not going to
happen” (3:79). Monte echoed Byron’s sentiment, “You know, getting that buy-in . . . so
many things go so much better” (3:78). Danisha plainly put it this way “If your staff is
happy, you're happy. And that's really kind of I think the way we live by. If they're
happy, they're performing better and ultimately you're happy” (4:56B).
PSAP leader as trusted insider. PSAP leaders expressed how building,
maintaining, or failing to be trusted impacted their ability to implement evidence-based
change. Monte described how a consultant was needed to add credibility to her data
indicating additional staff was required to achieve quality, “We had to bring in a
consultant because the numbers [weren’t] enough to be able to justify [the additional
staff] . . . after some, I won't say complaints, but concerns [were] raised by the public
safety agencies” (3:65). George, on the other hand, enjoyed the support of his leadership
and was trusted to present information in a public setting:
I was fortunate enough after the wind storm, to be able to present to our county
legislature the statistics from that event as I did [when] we had a large fire a year
and a half ago. And [I] was able to get the forum to present to the county
legislators to promote the [PSAP] division. (2:111)
Siobhan, talking again about her supervisor said,
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He'll listen to all my reasons for why I want to do something, or why I don't want
to do something. And let me know what he thinks. But, he's super supportive.
And I've been pushing for more training, and he's like, "Yeah, let's do it." (2:84B)
Clark depicted how he was trusted to make most decisions and how he worked with
others to build consensus,
I don't want to bother them [senior leadership] with little changes and procedures,
but when we do a major upgrade, or a major change, especially on the law
enforcement side, since we are a law enforcement agency, I have to be able to
communicate with them. But, yeah, they put a lot of trust in me, because they
know it's not a unilateral decision. (3:110)
Chris described how he has built trust across stakeholder groups over the years, “I've
been a trainer, I've been . . . the shift supervisor out on the floor going through everything
and then in the last 7 years into my current position” (4:42B). Larry established how his
professional journey prepared him for PSAP leadership and qualified him as a NYS 9-1-1
standards developer,
I had an EMS [emergency medical service] background. I had a fire service
background. I have a police background, and I have a dispatcher background. I
used to say that I was the only one that had all four disciplines. (1:69A)
Interestingly, Larry introduced an unforeseen theme regarding the rise of PSAP
operations as a public safety discipline worthy of equal treatment and scholarly study.
This theme is addressed more directly in the responses to sub-question 4.
Training. PSAP leaders cited providing training in association with reinforcing
quality and setting quality expectations. Lillian recalled how telecommunicators used
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their training to find an injured driver who did not know where he was after overturning
his all-terrain vehicle, “So this is where the staff tends to step up . . . they used their
training, and other people got involved, and worked as a team, they used his cell phone
technology to map where he was” (1:26). Former PSAP leaders, such as Larry
acknowledged training was not originally a formal process “You learned from the older
guy in the room” (1:89), whereas current PSAP leaders, like Clark, used retention rates of
new trainees as a measure of quality,
About 50% make it through the training program, 50% do not. And it would be
easy for me to say, "Well, it's just the people. They can't do the job. They can't
multitask. They don't have enough technology background." But that would be
very narrow minded of me to think that. Yes, that's a possibility. But now I have
to say to myself, and this is a goal for next year, let's revamp our training
program. Let's try to make it more successful. So how do we know our standards
are good? Well, if we see more people who are getting through the training
program and being more successful, maybe that's a way to gauge that we're doing
a good job. (3:94)
Similarly, Chris stated that his agency is updating their training to meet current
Association of Public Safety Communications Officer (APCO) standards and the needs
of individual trainees, specifically millennials,
All of our trainers have to be CTO certified through APCO. . . . We have changed
everything and looked at all sorts of stuff on how to train somebody because it has
changed so much. Because the people that we're even getting in now, the younger
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[generation] will ask so many different questions. So, it's, “Alright how do we
handle them?” So, we definitely have to change for each person (4:43A)
Chris, Tyler, and Danisha spent a considerable time discussing training during
their session. Danisha described how she initially reacted and then paused to reflect in
response to a telecommunicator “freezing” during a large fire,
My initial reaction was, "What the hell." But then you gotta really look at it, the
big picture, and go “Okay, how often does she sit in that seat [fire dispatch
position]? How often is she working this position? How much training has she
been given? Were you aware that she wasn't comfortable? And if you were, did
you do anything about it?” (4:17B)
Danisha then went on to describe her interaction with the employee and how she resolved
to give the telecommunicator refresher training rather than pursuing disciplinary actions,
She knew exactly what went wrong. She didn't hide it. She didn't sugar coat it.
She knew. So, I said, “What can we do in the future to make it better? What can I
do to make you more comfortable?” . . . So, bottom line, we came up with a
training plan for her to move forward so that she can become more comfortable
and perform better.” (4:19)
Going back to Chris, he expressed how PSAPs can provide better standards of care by
providing better training and better policies:
Okay what can we do better? How can we prevent this [poor performance] from
happening again and make changes? We made changes in our training to where
we're making sure that we're covering in service refresher [training] every year . .
. [and] making sure policies are getting designed better. (4:23)
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Tyler echoed how he was also making changes to his PSAP’s training program,
We're trying to empower our trainers . . . but we're redoing our entire training
program. We didn't throw it out and start all over again. There was nothing wrong
with the actual training piece of it, we were just training people badly. . . . We've
sectioned it off into pieces and [now] there's benchmarks. (4:39)
Returning to Danisha, she described that supporting quality required a continuous effort
on behalf of PSAP leaders, even though their employees may not always appreciate the
effort,
[The] best way to improve is just . . . continuous training. They [employees] like
to have training. I mean they'll complain about, "Oh you have training again." But
then they come back and they're like, "Oh yeah we should have been doing this.”
And it refreshes them. (4:88)
From a different session, Byron detailed how long it takes to train a quality employee
using a mix of nationally certified and local training programs,
Our training, and we have modified our training over the years, is . . . 20 days in
class, 160 hours we'll call it. And part of that is learning the APCO [certified
course material], that’s the first 40 hours. And then also, the EMD [24 hours of
certified training]. And then the balance of it is for [local] call taking, and
policies procedures, and CAD [Computer Aided Dispatch training] and telephone
use. And then they're on the operations floor with a trainer. If you're a call taker,
you're on the operations floor until you're certified. That could be three, four
months. (3:100)
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PSAP leaders often used refresher training in response to poor performance, as
alluded to earlier with Danisha; sometimes retraining occurred after disciplinary action
was taken. In some cases, employees failed to respond to these opportunities by
improving performance. Chris explained how even seasoned employees could fall
behind on performance,
I've had 25-year employees that have gone back into remedial training because
we're catching issues and go, "This is not right." I have somebody out right now
that's had some issues that it's not safe for them to answer a phone call, so we
have to figure out what our next steps are right now because we're not sure what's
going on. (4:33)
Lillian described her frustration with the same employee making the same mistakes “over
and over again, and we would try to do remedial things, counseling and retraining”
(1:58). Casper relayed a detailed account of how he and his supervisors went to great
lengths to correct an employee’s sub-par performance,
I actually switched shifts for a month to work with this person one-on-one. . . .
And the employee knew that mistakes were being made. The person was upset at
their performance. And my idea was, "Okay. Let's try to do this. Maybe not retrain but re-emphasize some things." And at the end of the month-long period . .
. if the person fell into the same kind of rut, it would not be sensible to try to do
any more training [the employee would be fired]. The person has been a
dispatcher for long enough that they should know the basics. And some things
they were really dropping the ball on [were] little things; basic, basic things.
(2:22)
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Casper’s story along with the other previously discussed experiences of PSAP
leaders highlighted the concern that training PSAP telecommunicators requires
significant resources in terms of both funding and time. Larry recalled that “recertification was again a financial concern” when considering implementation of his
agency’s EMD program (1:86). The time and effort required to train, recertify, and
sometimes retrain employees also impacted PSAP leaders’ ability to perform other
quality improvement tasks such as reviews, which is discussed in our next section.
“Staffing and time.” Participants consistently cited lack of staffing and time as
the primary barrier to performing quality improvement tasks (such as reviews) and
reinforcing standards of care within their agencies. George detailed how he had to make
the difficult choice between performing quality improvement reviews or training new
employees,
I'm in a difficult position, at least in my county, where we do some QA/QI but, I'll
admit, we don't do it enough. And we don't do it enough because they don't have
the staffing to do it. . . .We've been in a unique situation with hiring. We've put on
eight people in the last 12 months. I have one supervisor that can't even work a
shift because he's doing nothing but training. (2:89)
Cliff, a former PSAP leader, relayed how “we were all in the [PSAP] business before any
kind of formalized plans [for quality improvement reviews] were in place. Formalized
plans, and the time to do them are a luxury, and particularly in New York State because
of funding [emphasis added]” (1:44). Later in the same session, Cliff described how the
costs to implement newer technology, such as Next Generation 9-1-1, will create even
more pressure on PSAP leaders to prioritize scarce resources,
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It [Next Generation 9-1-1 technology] will only exacerbate the problem of not
being able to have the resources to be able to have the quality review. So, there's a
lot of dynamics going on that make the QA piece be something that is always
going to be a struggle, not because people don't want to do it, but because there
just isn't the financial incentive, or the commitment to put the resources in place
to do it correctly. (1:178)
Casper lamented how he had no resources to perform quality improvement reviews,
We basically have no QA/QI at all. I tried doing it when we first went to EMD,
but I was having to come in umpteen [an excessive amount] hours a week. And at
that time, we had an antiquated recorder system, which made it even worse. Just,
if my position was different where I could do things like that, I probably could
implement it, but we just don't have it. Staffing. We just don't have anybody to do
that. (2:96)
Casper then illustrated the sense of despair some PSAP leaders, particularly those from
smaller agencies, encountered knowing they could provide higher standards of care if
only given the resources,
I've worked my department for 25 years, and the staffing level has never changed.
Two per shift [2 telecommunicators covering 9-11- and dispatch services for an
entire NYS county]. Period. It's never changed. And I don't foresee it changing by
the time I retire. I can see your reactions, and it is dumbfounding that in 2018,
we're at the same staffing level we were before I started. . . . I don't know whether
we do, per se, a good enough job that people are okay with it, or everybody higher
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up just doesn't see the reasoning behind increasing the staffing. But we're very,
very backwards in that sense. (2:97)
In an earlier session, Lillian recalled her exasperation when confronted with having too
much to do and not enough time or resources to do things like quality improvement
reviews correctly,
A lot of that comes back to like Larry said, the budget thing, who does that
[perform quality improvement reviews]? Who has the time to do that? You know?
Your supervisors are acting as call takers [front-line telecommunicators], your
managers are doing all the things the manager's do, who has the time? It really
should be another whole person dedicated to that in your PSAP to just do it
[quality improvement reviews] right? (1:175)
As an example of how much time is required to implement new standards of care, Clark
shared how his agency took 18 months to create, update, and implement new police
standards of care while negotiating with differing stakeholder groups to accomplish the
intended goal of improving PSAP quality,
You also should try to work with the field providers [emergency response
agencies, in this example law enforcement agencies]. However, be cautious. We
implemented police protocols. We were looking to do this for a long time, back to
QA, and tried to standardize how we do things. And this was an 18-month
process. It took that long. (3:73)
Chris revealed how staffing issues, such as needing to train new supervisors, interfered
with performing reviews and how agencies required a dedicated quality improvement
position to achieve a higher standard of care,

94

Our quality assurance program has declined . . . over the years because of trying
to get supervisors [trained] and we're actually putting a full-time person in to that
spot [quality improvement position] and changing around the procedures and stuff
so we can do that, which will make that a more consistent program . . . a lot of our
supervisors are very much in support of that. (4:54)
Across all sessions and PSAP agency sizes, PSAP leaders identified staffing and time as
the primary obstacle to providing quality or achieving higher standards of care. PSAP
leaders advocated for PSAP positions dedicated to performing quality improvement
reviews but confessed the ability to secure funding for such positions was highly
unlikely. Interestingly, PSAP leaders often advocated for increased supervision of PSAP
operations at the same time as advocating for more quality reviews, a sub-theme
discussed next.
PSAP first-line supervisors as distinct role. The need for dedicated PSAP
supervision was not an a priori code but emerged during coding. PSAP leaders felt
strongly that PSAP supervisors should not be performing the work of front-line
telecommunicators such as answering phones or handling radio traffic. Instead, PSAP
leaders stated that supervisors should be available to answer telecommunicator questions,
troubleshoot technology issues, or provide immediate feedback to employees.
Some PSAP agencies, most of them larger in size, have their supervisors review
calls as part of their duties. Byron stated his “supervisors listen to and review the call,
and [then] pass them back to the employee for their comments and feedback” (3:12A).
Likewise, Siobhan used her supervisors to perform quality improvement reviews due to
lack of a dedicated reviewer. Supervisors reviewed calls for employees they supervised
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and two supervisors “from a different shift platoon” (2:93A). Siobhan revealed how the
process completely broke down when one of her supervisors could no longer keep up, “I
had a guy that was a CTO, who had a little hissy fit, and he has now stepped down from
being a senior [supervisor] and went to a [front-line telecommunicator position] and
resigned his CTO position. (2:92).
PSAP leaders wanted a clear separation of duties for their supervisors. Lillian
adamantly exclaimed, “Dispatchers [telecommunicators] need supervisors, not standing
over top of them all the time, but they need somebody in the room to defer a quick policy
question . . . and typically [they] don't have that. Again, a funding situation” (1:109).
Lillian then described how “because of staffing levels, and call volume” her supervisors
were required to act as front-line telecommunicators “pretty much all of the time, rather
than just be a supervisor” (1:112A). She then explained why it was so important to have
supervisors unfettered by front-line telecommunicator duties using what seems like
hyperbole yet represented an all too often occurrence, “If that supervisor's in the middle
of a [9-1-1] call themselves, they just can't say, ‘Hold on, I know you're having difficulty
breathing, let me put you on hold while I answer this [telecommunicator’s] question on [a
different] call’” (1:112). If supervisors are tied down by front-line telecommunicator
duties, they don’t have time to supervise and help their subordinates.
PSAP leaders from later sessions spent considerable time discussing the role of a
PSAP supervisor and how important the supervisor role plays in promoting quality within
a PSAP. Monte “worried” that her employees would not spend “one-on-one time with
the supervisor for these reviews . . . to discuss, especially, anything that stuck out, or
anything that has a lot of comments in the [quality improvement] system” (3:26). Earlier,
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in the senior leadership section, we discussed how Clark engaged his county board to
demonstrate how he needed dedicated supervisors available to help front-line employees.
Like Clark, Monte also went to her county leadership to advocate for additional
supervisory staff,
We went to our legislature proposing a change in staffing, which everyone here at
the table understands that it's very difficult to get positions added to your
department in this time, date, and age. With the goal of having the supervisors
supervise. To not just be the glorified break-giver and things, but to actually
supervise. To do QA, to work on other things. To listen and join [active 9-1-1
calls] and catch things before they did become an issue. (3:49)
Byron revealed “from a supervisory standpoint, we are observing our staff on a
somewhat regular basis, especially with escalating incidents” (3:5) to help front-line
employees with additional task such as “phone pings [locating a cellular phone location]
for extenuating missing persons . . . managing a large event . . . and make their way
around to answer questions and help procedurally” (3:56B). Later Byron commented,
So, I, like Clark, don't want the supervisors committed to a 911 phone, or a
dispatch channel, unless we get into a situation where we're all hands-on deck.
And from time to time they may pick up that one or two calls that are in queue.
But typically, we try and discourage that. (3:56D)
PSAP leaders also discussed how supervisors who refuse to monitor employees or
employees ignoring their supervisors created quality issues. Chris admitted that an
administrative policy that was meant to help clarify the chain of command when two or
more supervisors was working backfired because “we kind of took power away from
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other supervisors and gave it to one when they all should have the same power” (4:58B).
Chris then had to go back to his supervisors and remind them, “no matter where you're
working, you're a supervisor. You should be monitoring things going on” (4:58D). Larry
commented how he often had to react to complaints from the public regarding poor
telecommunicator performance,
It's reported that a dispatcher was curt to a caller. You vox [review] the call, and
you find out yeah, that's the case. And some progressive discipline may be in
order, which leads to the whole supervisory function in 911. We don't have
enough. (1:108)
Unlike Larry’s relatively mild example of poor performance, Monte detailed how a
telecommunicator, for no valid reason, delayed an emergency response for an elderly
female that needed and ambulance,
An employee who [handled a] 911 call [and] was given the street, the cross
streets, and approximate house number, what color the house was, how many
houses on what side of the street from the nearest intersection the house was, and
an owner's name of the house. And [the telecommunicator] refused to send an
ambulance until she got better information. (3:28)
Given the life or death implications of errors in a PSAP environment, PSAP leaders
believed good supervisors were the primary promoters of quality within their
organizations. PSAP leaders also believed that organizational culture could either
reinforce or inhibit quality as discussed below.
Organizational culture. PSAP leaders gave examples of both good and bad
organizational cultures within PSAPs. Generally, participants enjoyed their workplace,
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the freedom given to them by their supervisors, and gave concrete examples of how their
employees rose to meet challenges. Larry started his session by praising his former
PSAP’s culture. He told a story about how telecommunicators responded to a 9-1-1
system failure after a lightning strike on a holiday weekend “when people would rather
be out picnicking and being with their families” (1:15A),
They [telecommunicators] sit home sometimes and listen to the monitor [radio
system]. And they knew we were in trouble, so my cell phone rang, "Hey do you
need any help?" And we called in additional staffing. . . . Then people that were
on shift when that happened offered to stay. I mean the normal person would say,
"Hey, my shift is over, I'm out of here. I can't take this anymore." That didn't
happen . . . it's like when dispatchers work at a 9-1-1 center, and their geographic
area is underwater, and they don't know if they have a house to go home to, but
they're willing to stay. And that's the kind of people that work for us. That's the
credit I would give to them. (1:14B and 1:15B)
Lillian also described how her team used “their training . . . technology . . . and that little
bit of thinking outside the box” to make a “big difference” and achieve a “happy ending”
when locating a man in a remote area trapped with a mangled limb (1:27 – 1:29).
Siobhan related how her supervisor gave her the support needed to improve training and
she sincerely stated, “I'm probably the luckiest girl in the world” (2:84C).
In the later sessions, PSAP leaders described the “team” atmosphere in PSAP and
how the team can overcome challenges. Chris spoke about how his telecommunicators
responded to a difficult CAD transition in the middle of summer because their old system
“was about to fail”:
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They worked together . . . throughout the year, they stayed positive. Got through
it as a team and then continued to work as a team to make changes . . . you can
get through those things and that shows how well a PSAP can actually work
together (4:3B)
Byron relayed how he tried to instill a culture that everyone in the PSAP succeeds
together or fails together,
If you can convince your staff that successes are celebrated by all, and so are
failures. Because when something bad happens, nobody says, "Clark, you
screwed that up." [Instead] it's like, "I can't believe 9-1-1 made that mistake." The
term is collective. And people refer to the 9-11- center, or the dispatch center, and
everybody that sits under that roof feels that pain when something bad happens.
(3:113)
PSAP leaders also gave examples of how complacency can set in, administration
can allow problems to fester, or how civil service and union due process can impact their
ability to reinforce standards of care. Tyler, when discussing employee resistance to
quality assurance feedback, shared “It’s a whole lot easier with some people than others.
Some are not into self-reflection. Some just could care less” (4:32). Casper described
how inaction by administrators can create a negative culture,
The previous administration tended not to want to make waves with employees. .
. . People knew, "Okay, what are they going to do to me? Probably nothing." So,
because there was never really any hardline discipline, I think that aggravated the
situation in general. So, people either felt resigned that nothing was going to
happen, or they didn't even bother to make some complaints. (2:21)
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Mirroring Tyler, yet in a different session, Clark’s vehemently argued that quality
improvement “isn’t about discipline . . . so it’s unfortunate that we have people who
always go on the defensive . . . there’s no quality improvement or quality assurance in
their mind” (3:35). He further expressed how PSAP leaders and their employees
sometimes have diametrically opposing ideas about quality improvement standards of
care,
QA is punitive in their opinion, when they get an EMD review, when they get a
fire review, and it's bad by definition, they go, "Oh, here we go. Somebody's
picking on me." That's not at all what QA is supposed to be about. It's supposed to
identify some weaknesses, give them the tools to change, and improve. (3:36)
Clark then went on to describe how relying solely on feedback can lead to complacency,
“If we're not getting a lot of complaints, I think we're doing an okay job. However, that
can make you complacent. You continually have to look at how to improve” (3:93).
When describing negative cultures such as complacency, resistance to change, or even
disciplinary measures, PSAP leaders often commented on their sense of powerlessness
when dealing with NYS civil service due process and unions.
NYS civil service. PSAP leaders felt that NYS civil service process not only
prevented them from hiring good candidates, but also made it nearly impossible to
remove poor performers. Byron described how the local civil service exam, a test that
applicants must take prior to hiring, doesn’t always meet the needs of his PSAP,
“unfortunately, we have never hired a full complement of vacancies [because] we just
haven't had the candidates” (3:99). Lillian also described how NYS civil service rules
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hurt her transition into PSAP leadership because civil service does not allow two people
to temporarily hold the same position,
When I first became a manager in the PSAP, the old manager was gone, and I
mean he was gone, so I didn't have that because with civil service, you can't
double fill, you can't keep that person around to kind of train you a little bit.
(1:116A)
Unions. PSAP leaders were especially exasperated by their inability to remove
poor performers, especially when unions became involved. Siobhan excitedly
complained how an employee with multiple disciplinary citations persisted at her PSAP:
I have an employee that is horrible. She is so rude to callers that, I can't even
control her. I actually put her through APCO's customer service class. And in the
last six months, she's had three records of counseling . . . and we just denied her
raise. . . . And she is pissed. And she's not mad at herself for doing the job
improperly. She's mad because she got caught. And it wasn't me who found it. It
wasn't a supervisor who found it. These were calls from the public. Somebody
actually called [an elected official’s office] to complain about her 9-1-1 call. And
[we] can't get rid of her. She's protected, between civil service and the union.
(2:29)
Similarly, George told his story about an employee who personally received counseling
from the PSAP’s chief executive often repeated “small mistakes . . . not following the
correct policy” (2:19B). When George’s leadership team looked deeper they found “that
almost every year, and almost their entire career, this person has had minor mistakes”
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(2:19D). George later lamented, “You have to put so much paper [written documentation
for poor performance] on top of everything . . . it takes forever” (2:30).
While some participants acknowledged unions have a good purpose, they often
get abused by poor performers. Clark discussed both the good and bad side of union
representation; he defended unions stating,
New York State has civil service protection, has unions. Almost every 911 center
[in NYS] has a union and that's good for people. I truly believe that it is. It should
be that insurance you hope you never need. (3:34B)
In the same session, Monte commented, “one of our biggest challenges is that the
supervisors and the dispatchers are both in the same union” (3:24). Monte explained how
her supervisors struggled to give adequate feedback to their subordinates because they
feared backlash, “it is tough for some people, even when they work in a supervisory role,
to be honest with other people” (3:25). Monte then told her story about how she was
investigating a complaint and her employee overreacted:
[While] just asking for “your [telecommunicator’s] side of the story”, my door
was slammed twice. I was told I was making them nervous. They demanded
union representation. It just went wrong. Everything went wrong with this . . . 2
years later [the union] are threatening me with the way I handled the “asking” for
“their side of the story”. . . . And now I'm being threatened, because they got a
lawyer. (3:31-3:32)
After defending the purpose of the union (described above), Clark commiserated with
Monte, “Monte gave an example of somebody who used their union in an incorrect way .
. . they would rather waive the union flag . . . [when] I just need to get ‘your side of the
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story’ to do an investigation” (3:34D). Monte’s poignant example demonstrated how
PSAP leaders are often caught in the middle between upholding standards of care and
facing emotionally exhaustive and lengthy legal battles just for doing their job.
Accreditation. In each of the sessions, participants identified accreditation as an
impetus to either meet or maintain standards of care within their agencies. In one of the
earlier sessions with former PSAP leaders, they told how PSAP accreditation was born in
NYS, primarily through the New York State Sheriff’s Association. Larry humorously
walked us through the logic at the time “One of our goals as an agency was to become
accredited, so to become accredited, let me think, there must be standards” (1:90 – 1:91).
Larry then described how he, Cliff and “a room of other people started sitting down, and
making the standards for the State of New York. And I think originally we came up with
21 different standards that we had to meet” (1:92). We will discuss both standards
development and peers later on, but it is interesting to learn how and why organizations
create accreditation processes that other organizations subsequently adopt.
Cliff described how his agency struggled to meet accreditation, even though he
was one of the standard makers and assessors, and that the process a PSAP went through
to get accreditation was as important as the accreditation itself,
My own PSAP hadn't gone through the process yet, because . . . the procedures
were in place, but the documentation wasn't all in place, and we were changing
some things, and had to finish dotting all the ‘i's’ and crossing all the ‘t's’. (1:124)
George, in a different session mirrored a similar sentiment, “As an accredited agency,
those big aspects [of quality assurance / quality improvement] are there, forced by the
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standards. And it's not a bad force, it's a good force [for] subtle changes to try to improve
quality” (2:36).
Some agencies sought accreditation not only at the state level, but also at the
national and international level with organizations such as the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) or APCO 33 (a PSAP training
accreditation program). Chris stated, “Our training program, because of our accreditation
with CALEA, is pretty thoroughly standardized . . . hopefully the first quarter of this
year, we'll have everything sent in for APCO 33” (4:53). Byron, who also runs a CALEA
accredited PSAP stated, “Because we are a CALEA accredited center, we send out
monthly surveys to the citizens” (3:4). We will cover how PSAP leaders used local data
during the discussion on sub-question 4.
PSAP leaders acknowledged that accreditation was valuable in promoting better
standards of care, but reminded us that accreditation only works if the standards mean
something. Larry recalled what he believed was the original motive behind accreditation,
“Accreditation, I think initially when it started out was more about the free press”
(1:127). Larry went on to state that accreditation only means something when assessors
are willing to deny accreditation if the standards are not met and tell PSAPs, “We'll come
back next year [indicating accreditation failure]” (1:128). Going back to Cliff, the
political aspect of early NYS Sheriff’s PSAP accreditation processes led him to throw out
the good with the bad,
I never realized it until many years later that I sabotaged myself . . . because I no
longer saw the value in it. Because another county went through and didn't really
do it, so what value is there? Now that's not really the case. . . . There is a lot of
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value to going through the process and making sure that you meet all those
standards [emphasis added]. (1:126)
This leads us to our next section where we discuss PSAP leader perceptions of standards.
PSAP Leaders’ Beliefs Regarding National Standards of Care
Sub-question 3 queried: “When do PSAP leaders believe evidence-based
management theoretical frameworks, such as national standards of care, should supersede
local and personal experience frameworks; when do they not?”. Participants believed
national standards of care, such as EMD, helped PSAPs provide quality care. Another
major theme participants expressed was standards must be adapted to the local PSAP
environment to accomplish the desired outcomes. Participants also described how
standards develop through local experimentation, discussion with peers (a separate,
though interconnected theme), regionalization, then national acceptance.
National standards of care as quality care. For many PSAP leaders, having a
nationally certified protocol to follow led to a better standard of care. Chris commented
on how his agency used the certification process through the National Center of Missing
and Exploited Children (NCEMC) to improve quality care,
We got certified with NCMEC. . . . They want us to ask all these questions, but in
reality we are definitely providing better care because if it comes that there is an
abduction . . . we are going through the guidelines. (4:76)
PSAP leaders across all session cited EMD as proof that national standards of care
provided better quality care. Danisha, when asked for examples of good national
standards, she stated,
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For us it was EMD. I mean hands down. We know that providing that service
makes a big difference in calls. How do we know? Because we save lives, and
we've seen it happen. We've had a couple situations where compressions and
mouth-to-mouth has truly saved a life. Delivering a baby, we've had two of those
since we've gone online with EMD. So, I think those end results there definitely
show staff. And you know, when something like that happens, we highlight it.
(4:75)
Similarly, George stated seeing good outcomes while using national standard of care
reinforced belief in the standards:
That's one of my best examples . . . [was] going to an official EMD program. And
it was all part of our accreditation process. But I think following [EMD] standards
. . . really sticks out. When you have a save of a cardiac arrest, a save of a choking
victim, [or] childbirth, all by pre-arrival instructions, I think that's why it stands
out, because those [example incidents] are the wow factor. And that's why we're
in the business. (2:59)
Cliff relayed how EMD was viewed so positively, implementation received buy-in from
all the stakeholders,
I don't know if we're a rarity, but when EMD went in at our county, the funding
was given pretty quickly. The dispatchers were completely on board with it. . . . I
know there's been counties where the union said, "Nope, we're not doing it until
you pay us more money." That didn't happen. They embraced it completely.
(1:77 – 1:78)
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At a different session, Clark admitted before EMD telecommunicators had to “hope they
had some medical experience to help somebody with choking or CPR” (3:82B). He then
declared, “EMD is obviously a perfect example of implementing something that has
obviously had better results, and better quality care for the caller” (3:82D) .
“It’s a template.” Although PSAP leaders acknowledged the importance and
effectiveness of national standards of care, they also cautioned that those same standards
of care should be adapted for local implementation. Returning to Clark, “APCO and
NENA [National Emergency Number Association] have great standards to go on. I think
though, remember, that's a template that they give you, and you have to modify it based
on the needs of your own agency” (3:95B). Likewise, Cliff stated, “The standard isn't
going to tell you exactly how to do ‘x’. It's going to give you a guideline on how to do ‘x’
in your environment. And then your own internal stuff is going to be there” (1:96). In a
later session, Danisha reflected, “As far as what the minimum standards of care are, it's
hard . . . because we all operate differently” (4:87a). Finally, George explained, “You
have standards and policies, but I think, in most cases, that standard of policy may not be
verbatim because it needs to have that local twist” (2:100). Next, we will discuss how
PSAP leaders perceive how standards should be developed and why standards
development was so important to them.
Standards development. PSAP leaders felt that standards should always be
under review and tested for validity. Former PSAP Leaders, like Larry, recalled “When I
came in, there were no standards. Nothing was written anywhere. . . . Standards are good,
because you create your standards, they're in writing, there's no question.” (1:148). In the
same session, Cliff described how standards emerge,
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I think it's important to understand [that] when it comes to standards, procedures,
and best practices . . . at some point in the past, it started out as somebody was
doing it “that” [a new] way, and someone talked to their neighbor and said, "How
are you doing it?" And they talked, and they said, "That's a great idea." So, now
two people became “in” [on the new standard]. Pretty soon, instead of just being a
practice, it became a best practice. And then eventually those people got together
to create standards, because they're well respected. And they created the standards
based on their own best practices, by hashing around to say, "Well, your best
practice is a little different than my best practice, but this standard is loose enough
that it lets us both play in a sandbox without offending anybody." So the standard
then gets put in place. (1:95)
In a different session, Casper described how emerging standards, such as notifying fire
responders that 20 minutes had elapsed since the time of call, gained momentum, “It’s
becoming a national standard that a lot of other agencies are using. We should join the
crowd [emphasis added] . . . because other agencies are having success with it” (2:38).
PSAP leaders confessed that standards sometimes arise due to tragedy. Larry
described a particular case from early in his career,
[Standards] change quickly . . . usually due to a national outcry. The Eddie Polec
story [Philadelphia, 1994]. Eddie was killed on the steps of St. Sicilia's church,
there was more than a dozen calls to 9-1-1 of a large crowd gathering with bats,
the dispatchers were curt and rude, Eddie's laying bleeding on the steps of St.
Sicilia's church. The PSAP has no commonplace file [listing of business names]
to figure out where the church is, and nobody can say that it's on the corner of
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“walk and don't walk”. . . . That raised the standards in 911. . . . I used to tell
dispatchers when we were training, the one thing you do not want in your career,
is to have Dateline come walking through the front door and want to interview
you. (1:135)
Danisha, reflected on more recent incidents receiving national attention,
So, things like an active shooter incident, you know we've seen them across the
country. So, what do we all do? Jump on board, “Hey, what's our active shooter
policy? Where are we with this because it could be us?” We've got a large city
school. Definitely it could be us. So, we looked at our policy, it was weak. We
developed a new policy. [We practiced] an active shooter incident. Did a full
scale [exercise]; brought all the agencies in. (4:107)
PSAP leaders warned that standards can become skewed, especially when
overreacting to critical incidents. Tyler stated, “Sometimes we over regulate, you know.
We try to fix a problem with a policy or whatever when we could have solved it another
way sometimes” (4:86). In a different session, Casper struck a similar tone, “We've had a
knee jerk reaction from . . . [an incident] that may never be repeated in 25 years, all of a
sudden something happened, something went wrong, now we've got to change the
procedure for this extreme type situation” (2:47). Cliff warned that larger agencies may
have an advantage when creating or updating standards:
You talk about standards being obsolete, and this is a huge problem, and the
national standards require people to volunteer their time at NENA or APCO, and
there's a very strong possibility sometime those standards can be skewed in a
particular way, because only particular agencies have the wherewithal and the
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resources to allow their people to be involved in creating those standards. So they
could be skewed to larger agencies that might have those resources, and neglect
the agencies that are smaller. (1:156)
Lillian joined in on the comment, “smaller agencies might not have the budget to send
somebody to a particular [conference], or take them off the [PSAP operations] floor to
allow them time to even just get on a conference call” (1:158).
PSAP leaders also warned that standards quickly become obsolete and must be
reviewed regularly. Chris stated, “You have to review them. . . . We review our
standards every year and they go out to the floor for a review. . . . You need to cover
everything” (4:89). Larry commented, “Standards in 911, they'll change slowly at a
snail's pace” (1:135A). Larry continued later in his session, “a standard can sit in a threering binder for years, and it never even be an issue. And when you go back and read the
standards, maybe a lot's changed” (1:149). The constant need to keep up with changes in
standards, sometimes driven by technology (discussed below), forced PSAP leaders to
become self-taught experts, a theme discussed more thoroughly in the next section.
PSAP Leaders’ Alignment with Evidence-Based Management
Sub-question 4 asked: “How do PSAP leaders’ views align with evidence-based
management theory?” Evidence-based management theorists posited the best decisions
are made using the best available evidence. Participants routinely discussed the use of
local data collected to justify decisions, measure success, or advocate changes to policy.
PSAP leaders perceived adaptation of standards with local data was critical to local
success. Original research was rarely mention or used, but an underlying theme
describing the lack of 9-1-1 operational research or the inappropriate application of other
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public safety disciplines (law, fire, or medical) to the PSAP environment was consistent
across all sessions.
Local data. PSAP leaders advocated the use of local data including, but not
limited to, call statistics, quality improvement reviews, and dispatch time benchmarks to
improve the performance of their telecommunicators and make decisions regarding
standards of care, policies, and staffing. Chris recounted how he used multiple
measurements to evaluate performance,
There are so many different things that you are measuring your performance by;
looking at your statistics that you use. As you measure your reviews, your
evaluations, you're measuring everything, you have to take each thing and put it
together as a whole package and see “What's our weak points? What's our strong
points?” . . . I think there is not one item at all that is going to take and measure
any PSAP. And you have to use multiple tools. If you don't use multiple tools,
then you're not taking and measuring it right. (4:4)
In a different session, Byron’s agency performed an internal study to test and invalidate a
long-standing PSAP standard regarding verifying addresses twice, “We eliminated the
piece where we're re-verifying the address, we didn't see any increase in address errors . .
. and we saw a decrease in our call processing time” (3:68B). By eliminating those extra
seconds, Byron’s PSAP saved hours of call processing time over the course of a year
allowing for reallocation of scarce resources, “That's beneficial to the agencies, it's
beneficial to us, it's beneficial to the citizens” (3:68C). Later, Byron went on to say,
You have to use the evidence and the data that is attached to your demographics.
It's not always prudent to look at what's happening in another state, even another
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county that borders you, because situations are different, demographics are
different. Your fire service, your EMS service, they operate differently. (3:106)
In yet another session, George used the same argument about demographics, but also
pointed to geography as a local concern along with call numbers driving staffing:
You have to understand what's going on locally because [of] your demographics. .
. . As an example the county we're sitting in right now has little or no water. I
come from a county that I'm virtually a peninsula. . . . People laugh when I say
that . . . [but] that changes how you're going to deal with stuff, and what [fire
apparatus resources] you're looking for because your situations are always
different, and you may respond to things differently. Your interaction with other
agencies, I think, is always different. And then you look at your numbers, your
staffing. Everyone's going to be different. (2:101)
After George’s comment, Siobhan and George turned to Casper and asked him if he ever
used his call volume data to justify additional staff at his center considering his pitiable
comments earlier (see “Staffing and time” above). Below is how the exchange
proceeded:
Siobhan: What's your call volume, though? I mean, can you drive for more
staffing by call volume?
Casper: I don't know. I've never done one of those.
Siobhan: Because, I mean, that would evidence based, to get you more staffing.
Casper: And I've never really looked. I've considered it, but I've never really
looked into it to say, okay, in terms of either phone calls received or complaints
processed. (2:103)
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Finally, Cliff stated effective implementation of quality care “is taking standards from
multiple places, and saying, ‘How do these all play together in our [local] environment to
achieve our goal?’” (1:100).
9-1-1 as a unique discipline. During the post-interview coding process, a new
theme emerged regarding 9-1-1 as an expertise, unique from other public safety
disciplines, which was not an a priori element. Larry put it candidly, “You have people
making decisions about 9-1-1 that don't have a clue what 9-1-1's all about” (1:63). Larry
followed up his statement a little later,
Most [other] disciplines only think there [are] three: police, fire, and EMS. They
forget that there's a 9-1-1 dispatcher, and those people have to know it all. They
have to know police, fire, and EMS, and they have to know the dispatch
operations in a 911 center. (1:69 - 1:70)
PSAP leaders also confessed that they did not read original research on PSAP operations
because it did not exist. Most of the secondary research PSAP leaders used were from
other disciplines such as the fire, emergency medical, or police sciences. Cliff reflected,
I don't know if I've ever read original research, and then based any kind of
decision on it. . . . Yeah, and I also think that the place that you [the researcher]
are now, right? The place that the 9-1-1 world is now is different than it was when
I was active . . . I think if you would have said, "Hey, go find somebody that has a
PHD in 911 call taking”, right? [Larry interjects] They didn’t exist! [Cliff] Even
today. (1:163 - 1:164)
In a different session, Byron, stated “We can look at something and have it mean
something much differently than the fire service could” (3:106A). In yet another session,

114

George discussed how 9-1-1 has transitioned into a separate and distinct profession,
“When I started 20 years ago, road patrol [law enforcement] people were working inside
communications, so they understood the flow. Now a new person never sees
communications and they don't understand it” (2:72). Going back to Larry, he bemusedly
put it this way, “As soon as we went from three-by-five cards and crayons to real live
computers, it became a profession, because the computer programming was very specific
to the dispatch function” (1:170). PSAP leaders identified themselves as different from
the other professions, and actually welcomed participating in original research in order to
promote 9-1-1 as an emerging scholarly discipline, something that will be discussed
further in Chapter 5.
Other Findings
Participant deliberations did not remain within the neat confines of the research
questions. While some of the themes discussed below were partially identified as a priori
elements, the themes largely emerged through the iterative cycles of coding leading to
new codes and lenses to view them through. Below, we will delve deeper into each new
theme with the understanding that some analysis and evaluation of broader meanings will
occur in Chapter 5.
Peers. Surprisingly, participants identified peers as a primary resource to create,
validate, or update standards of care. Larry recalled how it all started in the late 1990s in
NYS,
I think one of the best things that ever happened in the state was the formation of
the [New York] State 911 Coordinators Association, because it opened that door
to the sharing of knowledge, and typically any time the coordinators got together,
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there was the local tour offered of: “Come see my center”. And without a doubt,
everybody that went on a tour took something back to their agency that, “Hey, we
can use that”. (1:107)
Byron boldly admitted, “We look at best practices. We use input that we get from other
9-1-1 centers, because we're all in this together, so we should probably be sharing and
stealing from each other” (3:67). In her session, Danisha profoundly expressed how
other PSAP leaders were not only a resource, but also a community,
I used to joke that the best thing about Coordinator conferences was dinner
because we're all BS'ing [bull-shitting] about what we do every day and our staff
and what goes on. That's how we work. And we also feel like we're not alone.
(4:94)
Earlier in the discussion regarding standards, both Cliff and Casper (from different
sessions) illustrated how peers help promote standard adoption. Here again, is Cliff,
I think it's absolutely vital. Absolutely vital for anybody that's in a leadership role
in a 911 center to not only talk to their neighbors regularly, but to be involved in
at least regional and state organizations to share ideas. . . . And not only just go,
but participate. (1:104)
Larry, Cliff, and Casper described agencies that did not follow standards or participate in
the state 9-1-1 association as “backwards”, Casper elucidated further,
I'll get something on the listserv [NYS 911 coordinators list server e-mail group],
and somebody asks a question, and “Okay, maybe that is something to think
about”. Or, help them, give an answer of what we do, and then see what other
responses somebody gives, and see how ours compares. Because we may, we may

116

[sic], be doing something in good faith, only to find out that everybody else who
answered that same question is saying “No”. Or it reinforces when it's “Yeah,
we're kind of normal . . . Okay, we are doing like others.” (2:55)
Tyler shared, “In reality, we think we're so different and we're not . . . we shoot stuff off
of each other using our email groups and things like that” (4:91). When discussing
troubling employees, George commented that, “everybody has them” and how he can
pick out the same “personality” while visiting another PSAP (2:26).
Participants enjoyed sharing their stories and experiences with each other. In one
session, the term “group therapy” was jokingly alluded to, but there was a palpable
feeling of comradery at each of the sessions. As stories were told, participants jumped in
claiming they had the “same” situation, questioned fellow PSAP leaders on policy details,
and offered advice or resources to help solve their fellow participant’s problems.
Interestingly, for all the talk surrounding applying national standards to their local
resources and data, PSAP leaders generally agreed that “the state” should do more to
standardize the quality of service all NYS PSAPs provide to the public.
New York State governance. PSAP leaders felt strongly that the State of New
York should take a more active role promoting standardization, providing funding, and
leading the state to develop solutions to technical challenges. Cliff advocated for state
leadership since NYS had many peculiarities not found in other regions:
In New York State, we face so many more challenges that people in other states
don't, between civil service, and lack of funding, and all those types of things.
People in other states don't really face those same challenges, so I think it's really
important to share that knowledge within the state. (1:114)
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Participants felt that the state had a fundamental role in establishing standards of
care. Danisha commented how state requirements for EMD finally forced her agency to
adopt national standards of care, “It's [EMD] becoming a standard. We want to make sure
that we are up to date with the processes that are in other 911 centers. The state could do
an audit at any time” (4:57A). George firmly believed all PSAP in NYS should meet the
same standards of care:
That's why it's important to have standards at higher levels, if you will. State
standards [sic]. And New York State's a perfect example. Having a set of
standards that county wireless PSAPs have to meet, that every other PSAP doesn't
have to meet, there's a perfect example of [why] everything's so diverse. . . .
When you hear stories of 9-1-1 centers that don't have to fall under that state
standard with one person in a [PSAP operations] room. So, if that person leaves
the room, who's covering [the 9-1-1 calls]? Not delivering EMD. We discussed
earlier how important EMD was. So that center doesn't have to deliver EMD?
(2:86 – 2:87)
Clark recalled how his agency was “getting our standards from what the state says that
we should get” (3:95A) as well as other national organizations previously discussed.
PSAP leaders, especially county PSAPs, did not always agree the state should
have a leadership role. Cliff remarked,
15 years ago . . . 57 [county] 9-1-1 coordinators in New York state [would] say,
“We don't need a state 9-1-1 coordinator, we can do it ourselves. We don't need
the state telling us what to do. . . . Now it’s completely opposite, because we need
to have coordination. (1:179)
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One of the primary reasons behind that shift from local to state governance was the
pressing technological needs and costs associated with next-generation 9-1-1. While
next-generation 9-1-1 is not within the scope of this study, technology and how it
influenced PSAP leader decision-making came up frequently, and not always in a
positive way.
Technology. PSAP leaders felt technology was helpful, especially when trying to
locate callers (as previously discussed), however participants more often than not
described technology as a hurdle or a crutch. Revisiting Chris’s cultural story about his
center coming together as a team during a CAD upgrade, the team persevered in spite of
the technological “bumps and bruises” the team endured (4:3A). Larry recalled how it
was technology challenges that gave birth to the NYS 9-1-1 Coordinators Association,
We had issues with vendors not giving us proper data information on 9-1-1
landline calls. Cellular [phones] hadn't even been thought of yet. . . . This county
would fix issues in the database, and then all of a sudden a year later, the issues
rose up again, because they [telephone providers] didn't update the database, and
they corrupted it with the issues that were corrected in the previous year. That was
a huge issue. And when one county's talking to a vendor, it's not a big deal. When
you have 62 counties talking to one vendor, that's a big deal, and they listened.
And those issues went away, because we had strength in numbers. (1:120)
One of the association’s founding members, Roy Althiser, “figured out that we all have
the same problems, we all have the same issues [and said] ‘Let's get together and figure
out the same solution” (1:119).
Other PSAP leaders were critical of telecommunicators over-relying on
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technologies such as CAD or not verifying the 9-1-1 data they were getting. Lillian
posited, “And the technology aspect comes in, and it's great. It's huge. . . . But I think
sometimes they depend too much on the technology, and don't listen to the caller . . . and
the technology isn’t always 100%” (1:52). Clark warned,
I think this is an important point to make too, as far as performance. We have
such great technology now. We have Computer Aided Dispatch. We have
computers that literally tell us our job. What happens when the computers fail?
(3:42)
Clark then elaborated how a CAD failure during a fire “with a person trapped” caused a
telecommunicator to panic. He happened to be walking by, heard the concern, and then
instructed his employee to “Go old school” (3:43). Clark felt one measure of a
telecommunicator’s performance is how well they react “when something they're using
every single day to do their job fails, like a computer” (3:45).
Recent changes in technology and the forecast of more changes to come, worried
participants. Tyler complained, “A text-to-911 call takes forever, you know, I mean
there's a lot of work in that” (4:114). Lillian commented that national standards of care
move slower than technology advancement:
The technology changes so fast, and the standards, because of the research, and
the time put into them don't, especially coming from the national organizations
with all the review process, and all that. By the time a standard's written,
sometimes it's almost obsolete. (1:155)
PSAP leaders viewed technology as a never-ending challenge with both risk and reward.
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Primary Research Question and Summary of Results
Coming back to the primary research question: How do NYS wireless PSAP
leaders support effective implementation of quality care? The revelations from each subquestion in part, informed the whole. Participant definitions and measurements of quality
care centered on PSAP telecommunicators’ abilities to quickly and accurately get
responders to the appropriate location, sometimes in spite of technology failures. PSAP
leaders felt that factors such as buy-in from multiple stakeholder groups and
organizational culture were neutral factors (could be either good or bad), whereas factors
such as proper training and accreditation were primarily positive. Participants cited lack
of funding, time, quality improvement staffing, and dedicated supervisors as the primary
obstacles (negative factors) for quality improvement in their PSAP.
PSAP leaders advocated for national standards of care and proposed the State of
New York mandate universal standards for all PSAPs, provided PSAP were able to adapt
those standards to their unique resources and the state assist with funding. Participant
views on using the best available evidence, largely in the form of local data and policy
experimentation, aligned with evidence-based theory, but the lack of original scholarly
research on PSAP operations highlighted a major gap in academia, especially considering
the life and death consequences of failure.
Other findings included the importance of peers to not only reinforce adoption of
standards, but also to serve as sounding boards and confidants during challenging times
which resonated with the researcher. The importance of both the NYS 9-1-1 Coordinator
Association and their call for a state 9-1-1 coordinator is discussed more in Chapter 5, but
cannot be understated, especially considering the looming technology changes ahead.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Across New York State, whether you are a traveler on the Thruway, attending a
football game in Buffalo, a NASCAR race in Watkins Glen, camping in the Adirondacks,
a show on Broadway, or at night in your home, there is an expectation that you will
receive quality care when you call 9-1-1. As detailed in Chapter 1, PSAP quality can
have life or death implications. Emergencies occur regardless of response agency
boundaries, the technical capabilities of the PSAP alerted, or the standards of care
employed by the responsible PSAP. According to the results previously discussed in
Chapter 4 and incidents discussed in Chapter 1, PSAP quality improvement standards of
care can be as random as the incidents that require emergency intervention.
For many who call 9-1-1, it is their first time asking for help from strangers. It
can be the worst day of your life and the stranger on the other end of that 9-1-1
connection can make life-altering decisions on your behalf. Perhaps the reason PSAPs
and their quality improvement programs have not received a great deal of scholarly
attention is because PSAPs, their leaders, and front-line telecommunicators handle a
majority of the 240 million 9-1-1 calls that occur annually in the United States of
America without complaint (NENA, n.d.-b). Unfortunately, we have no data to either
support or refute the previous sentence due to the lack of original research on PSAP
operations. This study evaluated PSAP leader perceptions of quality improvement from
an evidence-based management theoretical framework while answering the primary
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research question: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders support effective implementation
of quality care?
Implications of Findings
The study revealed PSAP leaders consistently defined quality as achieving
balance across multiple variables, PSAP quality improvement required staff, time, and
relationships where PSAP leaders emerge as scholar practitioners of evidence-based
management, and PSAP standards of care developed through peer engagement and
consensus at the local, state, and federal levels. The next few subsections will discuss
specific key findings and how they related to the literature and what the findings meant
within the larger scope of PSAP quality and NYS PSAP governance. Each subsection
discusses the highlights of the four sub-question findings. In future sections we will
discuss limitations and recommendations based on the key finding s of the study.
PSAP quality consistently defined as balance of variables. Throughout Chapter
4, PSAP leaders defined quality in very demanding terms. Participants defined PSAP
quality as achieving balance across a continuum of nuanced variables because a single 91-1 call may have “99 tasks that need to be done.” Telecommunicators must: (a) Be fast
AND accurate, (b) Use their judgement AND follow the protocol, and (c) Utilize all
available technology AND prepare for that same technology to fail. Figure 5.1
graphically represents how PSAP leaders reject the notion that their demands represent
mutually exclusive dichotomies, but rather, characterize a target along three continua to
reach optimum quality. The circle in the middle of the diagram characterizes a range of
acceptability where quality can be still achieved while allowing for the variable nature of
emergencies.
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Figure 5.1. PSAP Quality Model.
Interestingly, NYS Wireless PSAP leaders advocated similar definitions of quality
offered by telenursing managers in Australia. In both locations and industries, employees
viewed leadership instructions as inconsistent demands. For instance, in Chapter 2, we
heard a frustrated nurse complain that her managers offered two discordant quality
definitions, “Yes, use your clinical judgement but then no, you’ve got to stick to the
algorithms” (Russell, 2012, p. 202). Likewise, in Chapter 4, a telecommunicator
forwarded a 9-1-1 call to the wrong location because she wanted it to get done quickly,
sacrificing accuracy. However, PSAP leaders felt that balance, not dichotomies,
represented quality. In both industries, leaders should explicitly explain to employees the
need for balance with PSAP leaders using the model described above.
PSAP leaders regularly interchanged terms such as standards, protocols, and
policies while defining quality. Considering there is very little literature on PSAP
operations, part of this study was to help future researchers learn how PSAP leaders
operationalize these terms. For future studies, as discussed in the recommendations
section, terms should be defined for participants (qualitative) or subjects (quantitative)
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using the definitions provided in the APCO/NENA American National Standards (ANS)
documents.
PSAP quality was inconsistently measured. Participants confirmed both PSAP
and telecommunicator performance was not consistently measured from county to
county. PSAP leaders admitted that quality improvement reviews “take a back burner” to
other pressing needs such as training new employees. PSAP leaders valued having a
formalized plan for reviews but clearly identified the lack of staffing and time as barriers
to fulfilling those plans, something discussed in subsequent sections. PSAP leader
sentiments affirmed existing literature claims that good training, constant reinforcement,
and constant review were necessary to ensure compliance to national standards of care
(APCO, 2013a; APCO, 2015; Clawson et al., 1998; Clawson et al., 2012). PSAP leaders’
recognition that the standards are appropriate, yet sometimes ineffectively applied, will
be discussed in the next section regarding implementation factors and in the
recommendations section.
PSAP quality implementation required time, staff, culture, and relationships.
Participant discussions revealed that evidence-based quality improvement requires time,
appropriate staffing of both supervisory and quality improvement positions, a positive
organizational culture, and trust-based relationships with stakeholders. As previously
discussed in Chapter 2, both time and human resources were identified as costs and as
potential barriers to evidence-based management implementations (Crowley et al., 2012;
Glaub et al., 2014; Gloppen et al., 2016; Spector et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013;
Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Wright et al., 2016). PSAP leaders mirrored the literature
citing both time and lack of dedicated resources as barriers to effective implementations.
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Participants felt strongly that supervisors should be a separate role unfettered by
front line telecommunicator duties. Similar to the literature, PSAP leaders highlighted
how supervisors play a critical role when reinforcing evidence-based standards of care
(Armstrong, 2012; Bhave, 2014; Russell, 2012; Spector et al., 2015; Taylor & Campbell,
2011). Particularly in Bhave (2014), the frequency of supervisory reviews and
discussions with employees resulted in better protocol compliance and reduced
counterproductive work behaviors. We previously discussed Russell (2012) above, but it
bears reminding that supervisors should be available to help employees achieve balance.
Participants described organizational culture as being both positive and negative
indicating that culture was neutral factor, yet critical for successful implementation of
evidence-based quality improvement. The literature described accreditation as a positive
cultural factor for evidence-based management (Dorseif et al., 2016; Olola et al., 2016;
Spiri & MacPhee, 2013). Remarkably, PSAP leaders did not see accreditation as a
prerequisite for achieving quality, but rather a helpful process to building the
organizational culture to support and sustain evidence-based quality improvement.
PSAP leaders believed building trusting relationships with multiple stakeholders
was essential to leverage resources and achieve buy-in, described in the literature as
stakeholder engagement. As seen in the literature, PSAP leaders had to engage with
senior leaders (Guo et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee; 2013; Telep & Lum, 2014) and
middle management (Armstrong, 2012; Bhave, 2014; Russell, 2012; Spector et al., 2015;
Taylor & Campbell, 2011) in order to succeed. Unlike the literature, PSAP leaders also
focused on achieving buy-in from front-line employees. Participants believed being
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viewed as a trusted insider was important which was eloquently discussed in Wright et al.
(2016). A table depicting implementation factors is in Appendix E.
PSAP leader practices aligned with evidence-based management theory.
Participant findings added support to the current literature regarding evidence-based
management theory. PSAP leaders adamantly believed local adaptations to standards
using local data helped build trust and justify evidence-based standards of care, as seen
above in Wright et al. (2016) and advocated by evidence-based management theorists
(Briner & Walshe, 2014; Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006, Rousseau & Olivas-Luján, 2013).
PSAP leaders did not always acknowledge their data-driven action research as evidencebased management which was reminiscent of Bartlett and Francis-Smythe’s (2016)
findings regarding organizational psychologists using evidence-based principles without
conscious recognition of theory in practice.
The State of New York should promote PSAP quality. Participant discussions
uncovered a shift from local governance to more reliance on NYS for PSAP standards of
care improvement. PSAP leaders also affirmed the 9-1-1 standards influence model
presented in Chapter 1 with a slight modification: a dashed arrow indicating “PSAP
leader peer acceptance” was added after the study based on the Chapter 4 findings. PSAP
leaders discussed how the NYS 9-1-1 Coordinators Association, NYS Sheriffs’
Association PSAP accreditation standards, NYS county laws, and NYS wireless PSAP
regulations successfully led to better standards of care throughout the state, especially
evidence-based practices such as emergency medical dispatching (EMD). Participants
repeatedly advocated that all PSAPs in NYS, not just county-identified wireless PSAPs,
be held to the same standard.
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That said, PSAP leaders simultaneously called for the State of New York to help
county PSAPs with funding to meet such standards. Recently, the FCC identified that
“sufficient public record information exists to support a finding that New York diverted
funds for non-public safety uses” as a key finding in its report to Congress regarding
abuses of 9-1-1 funding (FCC, December 29, 2017, p. 3). More specifically, the FCC
found, “State tax records indicate that in 2016, New York collected approximately
$185,344,986 from the Public Safety Surcharge. During the annual 2016 period, the state
awarded approximately $10 million in grants to counties to support PSAP related costs”
(FCC, December 29, 2017, p. 47), meaning the State of New York misallocated over
94.6% of its surcharge revenues. While some of the misallocated revenues did support
other public safety programs such as statewide interoperable communications grants, the
paltry sharing of state resources, specifically designated for 9-1-1, with the PSAPs that
provided such services is beyond alarming and represented an incredulous
misrepresentation to taxpayers. We will discuss possible remedies in the
recommendations section.
Limitations
Limitations of this study included social desirability factors common to focus
groups, perhaps exacerbated by the recent dismissal of a well-known PSAP leader and
the fact that the researcher was a peer. The transcripts did show some minor social
desirability impacts at the beginning of some focus groups, but barriers quickly broke
down as PSAP leaders shared their experiences. The focus group atmosphere may have
mitigated social desirability impacts by ensuring participants did “not feel like we’re
alone.”
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Recommendations
The following section will cover recommendations for policy, academic
disciplines, and future studies. For policy, we will begin locally and expand outwardly
towards federal governance in keeping with the 9-1-1 standards development model. We
will discuss how PSAP operations should become a new public safety scholarly
discipline without losing its multidisciplinary roots and how future studies may build
upon the lessons from this dissertation.
Local PSAP leader recommendations. Local PSAP leaders should continue
using local data and experimentation to improve quality care. Local data such as call
volumes, on-air times, and address verification errors can help leaders make more
informed decisions regarding policies, procedures, and how best to adapt national
standards of care to their local resources. PSAP leaders should use both quantitative and
qualitative data to help decision makers.
Evidence-based management is not a panacea and requires a great deal of time to
collect, analyze, and present data in a way that is meaningful and enlightening to
stakeholders. More importantly, building trustful relationships with stakeholders is
critical to implementing any standard of care. While stakeholders may not always
understand the data, or even agree with the decisions, they must be able to trust the PSAP
leader’s intentions. PSAP leaders should continue to loudly advocate for PSAP
supervisors and quality improvement staffing through state organizations such as the
NYS 9-1-1 Coordinators Association or the local chapters of APCO and NENA. It is by
“strength in numbers” and challenging other PSAP leaders to “join the crowd” that our
voices may be heard.
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State of New York recommendations. The State of New York should review its
policy of diverting 9-1-1 revenues to the state general fund. Beginning December 1,
2017, the state is collecting 9-1-1 surcharges on pre-paid cellular devices which will
increase the revenues beyond the $185 million collected in 2016 (NYS Department of
Taxation and Finance, n.d.; FCC, December 29, 2017). Raising the percentage of
revenues shared with county PSAPs to represent only 10% of the revenue collected
would double the current funding allowing PSAPs to add the additional supervisors and
quality improvement staff needed to meet national standards of care. Along with the
increased funding, the State of New York could require adherence to national standards
of care, such as the 2015 APCO/NENA/ANSI comprehensive quality improvement
standard, without creating yet another unfunded mandate. The State of New York should
fund PSAP operational research and reinstate the PSAP inspection regime it abandoned
in 2010 to properly measure the impact of such funding and ensure the counties are
complying with the adopted standards. Additional studies, discussed in the following
recommendations would build on this study with the benefit of more robust resources.
Federal government recommendations. The FCC should continue providing
reports to Congress and publicly criticize states that divert 9-1-1 funding away from
PSAPs. The FCC and the executive branch should classify PSAP professionals as
protective services in its Standard Occupational Classification (APCO, n.d.) and classify
PSAPs as both national security and national transportation interests (the National 9-1-1
Program Office is already a part of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
Doing so would allow the executive branch and Congress to withhold grant funds related
to the Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation from states that divert 9-1-1
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revenues. Currently, the State of New York has little incentive to give up $175 million
(or greater) in annual revenue when faced with no loss in federal revenue for its
misallocation of funds. Finally, the National 9-1-1 Program Office should expand its
current research activities to PSAP operations with researchers who have experience in
both qualitative and mixed method methodologies. The current focus of national
organizations on technological issues is critically important, however, if the
telecommunicators using the technology are inept, poorly trained, or are not properly
informed of performance deficiencies, technology becomes a useless or a malignant tool.
PSAP operations emerging as a scholarly discipline. PSAP operations,
leadership, and scholarship are emerging as a separate and distinct discipline deserving of
research. In 2013, Gardett et al. (2016) found only 114 original research papers related to
PSAP operational research, most of which were focused on medical protocols and not on
dispatch operations such as quality improvement. We applaud the Annals of Emergency
Dispatch and Response for beginning this venture with the first peer-reviewed and
original research volume in 2013. Unfortunately, the publication is inextricably linked
with the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch which represents a conflict of
interest considering its vendor partner, Priority Dispatch Corporation, is one of the largest
providers of software and card-based protocols sold to PSAPs worldwide (Sutter et al,
2015). Similarly, APCO and NENA also sell services to PSAPs. Academic journals
should create (if they do not exist) and strictly enforce conflict of interest and disclosure
policies. An independent research arm consisting of 9-1-1 scholar practitioners, as
mentioned above, is sorely needed to ensure PSAPs have access to independent, original,
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and peer-reviewed research to promote future evidence-based improvements and critical
inquiry regarding their merits.
Future studies. As a more concrete and achievable recommendation, this study
should be built upon by NYS DHSES researchers, other states, and PSAP scholar
practitioners such as those currently enrolled in the APCO Registered Public Safety
Leader (RPL) program or the IAED Communications Center Manager program. Within
the State of New York, studies regarding supervisory and quality improvement staffing
among NYS PSAPs is sorely needed to identify potential gaps and ensure 9-1-1 funding
is adequately meeting quality improvement needs.
Conclusion
PSAP leader participants’ perceptions of evidence-based quality improvement
programs provided a unique insight into the current state of the 9-1-1 profession. PSAP
leaders support effective implementation of quality care by achieving buy-in from
stakeholders, building trust as leaders, and using local data to support their decisionmaking processes. While participants consistently agreed on general definitions of PSAP
quality, measuring quality was inconsistent from agency to agency. Time, staffing, and
funding were largely seen as barriers to effective implementation, while other factors
such as training, reviews, and accreditation were viewed positively. Stakeholder
engagement and organizational culture were perceived as neutral, yet instrumental, to
success. PSAP leader peer organizations at the state and national levels provided the
impetus for change for many participants. Current PSAP leaders are making the
transition from personally held beliefs to locally adapted national standards of care, yet
that transition needs continued support and funding from state 9-1-1 revenues.
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Appendix A
State 9-1-1 Governance Levels of Authority (NHTSA, 2013)
States
DC

Description
State-level 911 authority owns
or operates a single statewide
system with a single, stateoperated PSAP

CT, DE,
MA, ME,
NJ, VT,

State-level 911 authority
owns/operates a single
statewide system, and funds
and operationally supports
PSAPs
State-level 911 authority with
statewide geographic planning,
coordination, and funding
responsibility for full scope of
911

AL, AK,
AZ, CA,
FL, GA,
HI, ID,
IL, IN,
KS, MD,
MI, MN,
MT, NH,
NM, NY,
NC, OK,
OR, PA,
RI, SC,
SD, TN,
UT, VA,
WA,
WV, WY
TX

Characteristics
Washington, DC, is the only independent
entity and is counted as a “state” for the
purpose of categorization. In New
Hampshire and Rhode Island, the 911
authority is part of another state agency.
Vermont operates independently. In
Maine, Massachusetts, Delaware,
Connecticut, and New Jersey, the 911
authority is part of another state agency.

Only one of the 31 state 911 programs in
this category operates as a completely
independent state agency or function.
The remainder all are part of another
state agency, though beyond that there is
a great deal of diversity. For most states
in this category, the 911 function is a
full-fledged organizational component of
another state agency, and works within
the context and authority of that agency.
However, a few state programs are
simply attached to another state agency
for administrative support, and otherwise
operate independently. In some cases
there is also a separate board or
commission that sets policy and exerts
decision authority.
State-level 911 authority with less Texas is the only state in this category,
than statewide geographic
and operates as an independent state
planning, coordination, and
agency. In those parts of Texas outside
funding responsibility for full
of the state program’s geographic
scope of 911
responsibility, regional and/or local 911
authorities have independent
responsibility.
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AR, IA,
KY, MS,
NE, OH,
WI

State-level agency or board
with statewide responsibility
for a limited aspect of 911
(generally wireless)

Mississippi and Arkansas reflect
independent agencies or boards of this
sort; while Nebraska, Ohio, Iowa,
Kentucky and Wisconsin are part of a
larger state agency.

CO, ND

Informal state-level 911 focus or
coordination mechanism

Two states fall into this category. North
Dakota and Colorado.

LA, MO,
NV

No state-level 911 focus or
coordination mechanism

Three states fall into this category: Missouri,
Louisiana and Nevada.
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Appendix B
PSAP Leader Perceptions A Priori Code Book
Domain

Code

Description

9-1-1
Technology

ADV-911-TECH

9-1-1 Technology as
an impetus to
changing operations

9-1-1
Technology

AVOID-TECHCHG

Purposefully avoiding
upcoming
technological changes

Accreditation

ADV-ACR

Advocating
Accreditation

Accreditation

ASS-ACR

Assessing Other
Agencies

Accreditation

DEV-ACR

Developing
Accreditation
Standards

Accreditation

MEET-ACR

Meeting Accreditation
Standards

Accreditation

MNT-ACR

Accreditation

MOD-ACR

Examples
Adoption of
Enhanced 911,
Wireless 9-1-1,
Next Generation
9-1-1
Delaying
implementation,
waiting for
guidance, waiting
for funding
Advocating
Accreditation
Assessing other
agencies for
compliance to
accreditation
standards
Developing
accreditation
standards

Meeting
Accreditation
Standards
Maintaining
Maintaining
Accreditation
Accreditation
Moderating
Accreditation as
Organizational Culture moderating the
organizational
culture, typically
in a positive way
to reduce
resistance to
evidence-based
practices or
management
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Accreditation

REJ-ACR

Rejecting
Accreditation
Standards

Rejecting
Accreditation
Standards

Accreditation

SE-ACR

Seeking Accreditation

Accreditation

VALU-ACR

Civil Litigation

ADV-P-STA

Valuing
Accreditations
Standards
Advocating 9-1-1
standards

Civil Litigation

ALL-NEGL

Alleging Negligence

Seeking
Accreditation
Valuing
Accreditations
Standards
Political activity,
lobbying , internal
discussions
advocating
standard adoption /
compliance
Reports of PSAP
staff misconduct

Civil Litigation

INS-LITI

Insulating from
Litigation

Civil Litigation

LIT-P-STA

Litigating 9-1-1
standards

Civil Litigation

REA-ACCU

Reacting to
Accusations

Costs

COST-CAP

Costing Capital
Investment

Policy statements,
procedures for
handling
complaints
Civil or criminal
cases related to
PSAP policies,
procedures, or
standards
Complaint
investigations,
responses to
allegations
Costing Capital
Investment

Costs

COST-HR

Costs

COST-POL

Costs
Costs
Costs
Costs
Critical Incidents

COST-PRI
COST-TIME
EV-BEN
EV-COST
AT-TO MED

Costing Human
Resources
Costing Political
Capital
Prioritizing Costs
Costing Time
Evaluating Benefit
Evaluating Cost
Attending to Media /
Public Inquiry

Costing Human
Resources
Costing Political
Capital
Prioritizing Costs
Costing Time
Evaluating Benefit
Evaluating Cost
Press releases,
media briefings
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Critical Incidents

DEF-CR-INC

Defining Critical
Incidents

Mention of
"critical incident",
mention of
"defining
moment"
Investigating Incidents Internal
investigations,
external
investigations
Learning from past
After-action
incidents
reports, selfinitiated rather
than reactionary
Overreacting to
Major changes to
incidents
policy in response
to rare incident,
"punishing" all
PSAP employees
for action for one
employee
Repeating Errors
Repeated errors,
multiple
complaints for
same issue

Critical Incidents

INV-INC

Critical Incidents

LEARN-P-INC

Critical Incidents

OVER-P-INC

Critical Incidents

REP-ERR

Employees

BE-EMP

Being Employees

Employees

CONV-EMP

Convincing
Employees

Employees

CRIT-EMP

Criticizing Employees

Employees

DIS-EMP

Disobeying
Employees

Employees

ENG-EMP

Engaging Employees

Employees

FLW-EMP

Following Employees

Employees

PRA-EMP

Praising Employees

Participant
describes or relates
experiences as a
employee
Attempts to
persuade
employees
Criticizing middle
employees
Disobeying or
undermining
employees
Contacting,
meeting with, or
seeking input from
employees
Following
decisions of
employees
Praising middle
managers
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Evidence-Based
Management

ADP-RES

Adapting Research

Evidence-Based
Management

COL-EV

Collecting Evidence

Evidence-Based
Management

CRE-EVID

Creating Evidence

Adapting existing
research to current
problem or issue
Collecting local
data, collecting
research
Creating local data
collection
processes
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Evidence-Based
Management

EVA-EV

Evaluating Evidence

Evidence-Based
Management

EVA-RES

Evaluating Research

Evidence-Based
Management

LOC-RES

Localizing Research

Evidence-Based
Management

MAK-DECSIO

Making Decisions

External
Facilitators

ACC-EF-FIND

Accepting EF
Findings

External
Facilitators

ADP-EF-FIND

Adapting EF Findings

External
Facilitators

BU-TR-EF

Building Trust as EF

External
Facilitators

ENG-EF

Engaging with EF

External
Facilitators

EST-REL-EF

Establishing
Relationships as EF

Evaluating
evidence including
but not limited to
local data,
research findings,
or anecdotal
experiences. Not
mutually
exclusive.
Evaluating
applicability of
research to current
problem or issue.
Evaluating
research
methodology
Conducting
research or
replicating
research at local
agency.
Making a decision
based on evidence
or research
Accepting external
facilitator findings
a as valid or
necessary
Adapting external
facilitator findings
to organizational
needs or culture
Building trust with
organizations or
stakeholders as an
external facilitator
Contacting,
meeting with, or
seeking input from
external
facilitators
Establishing
individual
relationships as
external facilitator
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External
Facilitators

EV-EF

Evaluating EF

External
Facilitators

REJ-EF

Rejecting EF Findings

Evaluating or
setting criteria for
external
facilitators or
consultants
Reflecting external
facilitator findings
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External
Facilitators

SEL-EF

Governance

ADV-GO-STR

Governance

ADV-LE

Governance

DEN-LO-GOV

Governance

DEN-NA-GOV

Governance

DEN-ST-GOV

Governance

EST-GO-STR

Selecting EF

Processes for
selecting external
facilitators
Advocating
Lobbying or
Governance Structures advocating for
creation,
strengthening, or
maintaining a
governance
structure to
oversee 9-1-1
operations
Advocating
Participant
Legislation
advocates changes
to legislation to
change adopted
standards, funding
mechanisms, not
limited to quality
improvement
Denying Local
Local agency /
Governance
municipal
governance
oversight not
required or
required at
different level of
government
Denying National
Federal
Governance
governance
oversight not
required or
required at
different level of
government
Denying State
State governance
Governance
oversight not
required or
required at
different level of
government
Establishing
Local agency /
Governance Structures municipal
governance
oversight not
required or
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required at
different level of
government
Governance

FUN-STAND

Funding Standards

Governance

MAN-STA

Mandating Standards

Governance

REQ-LO-GOV

Requiring Local
Governance

Governance

REQ-NA-GOV

Requiring National
Governance

Governance

REQ-ST-GOV

Requiring State
Governance

Governance

SHARE-CU-GOV

Sharing Current
Governance

Middle
Management /
Supervisors

BE-MM

Being MM-Sup

Middle
Management /
Supervisors

CONV-MM

Convincing MM-Sup

Tying standard
compliance to
funding, such as 91-1 surcharge
revenues
Formal adoption
of standards by
law or regulation
by local, state, or
federal
governments
Requires local
agency / municipal
governance
oversight, not
mutually exclusive
of other levels of
government
Requires federal
governance
oversight, not
mutually exclusive
of other levels of
government
Requires state
governance
oversight, not
mutually exclusive
of other levels of
government
Participant
describes current
governance model
with group
Participant
describes or relates
experiences as a
middle manager
Attempts to
persuade middle
managers

150

Middle
Management /
Supervisors
Middle
Management /
Supervisors
Middle
Management /
Supervisors

CRIT-MM

Criticizing MM-Sup

Criticizing middle
managers

DIS-MM

Disobeying MM-Sup

ENG-MM

Engaging MM-Sup

Middle
Management /
Supervisors
Middle
Management /
Supervisors
Organizational
Culture

FLW-MM

Following MM-Sup

PRA-MM

Praising MM-Sup

Disobeying or
undermining
middle managers
Contacting,
meeting with, or
seeking input from
middle managers
Following
decisions of
middle managers
Praising middle
managers

ADV-CUL-CNG

Advocating Culture
Change

Organizational
Culture

CRIT-CUL

Organizational
Culture

ID-CUL-SYM

Organizational
Culture

PRA-CUL

Organizational
Culture

SET-CUL-EXP

Quality

ADP-QI-PRO

Advocating
change in
organizational
culture of PSAP
agency
Criticizing PSAP
Criticizing
Culture
organizational
culture of PSAP
agency
Identifying Cultural
Identifying
Symbols
organizational
culture symbols of
PSAP agency
(e.g., badge,
uniform, headset,
etc.)
Praising PSAP Culture Praising
organizational
culture of PSAP
agency
Setting Cultural
Setting
Expectations
expectations of
employees using
organizational
culture of PSAP
agency
Adapting Quality
Adapting quality
Program
improvement
program to local
agency needs
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Quality

DEF-QUAL

Defining Quality

Quality

ID-QUAL-EB

Identifying Quality as
EBM / EBP

Quality

MEA-QUAL

Measuring Quality

Quality

REI-QUAL

Reinforcing Quality

Quality

RES-QUAL

Researching Quality

Quality

SET-QU-EXP

Setting Quality
Expectations

Quality

STAFF-QUAL

Staffing Quality

Research Access

ACC-LIB

Accessing Libraries /
Higher Ed

Research Access

ACC-OL

Research Access

ACC-RES-DB

Accessing other PSAP
Leaders
Accessing Research
Databases

Research Access

ATT-CONF

Research Access

JOIN-PRO

Research Access

SU-PRJ

Attending
Conferences
Joining Professional
Organizations
Subscribing to
Professional Journals

Describing what
quality means to
participant
Participant making
the connection
between EBM or
EBPO and quality
improvement
Instrumentation of
quality, metrics,
evaluation reports
Reinforcing
quality through
reward or
emphasizing
intrinsic value
Researching
quality
improvement
programs or
evaluation
methods
Establishing
criteria, publishing
criteria
Creating or
staffing quality
improvement
positions
Accessing
Libraries / Higher
Ed
Accessing other
PSAP Leaders
Accessing
Research
Databases
Attending
Conferences
Joining
Professional
Organizations
Subscribing to
Professional
Journals
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Research Skills

BEN-OA

Benchmarking Other
Agencies

Research Skills

LA-RES-SK

Research Skills

LEARN-RES-SK

Research Skills

PR-RES-SK

Research Skills

RES-L/R

Research Skills

RES-PRJ

Lacking Research
Skills
Learning Research
Skills
Providing Research
Skills
Researching Laws /
Regulations
Researching
Professional Journals

Research Skills

RES-SCJ

Research Skills

RES-WEB

Researching Scholarly
Journals
Researching Websites

Benchmarking
using other agency
standards,
protocols, or
programs as the
example
Lacking Research
Skills
Learning Research
Skills
Providing
Research Skills
Researching Laws
/ Regulations
Researching
Professional
Journals
Researching
Scholarly Journals
Researching
Websites
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Senior Leaders

BE-SL

Being SL

Senior Leaders

CONV-SL

Convincing SL

Senior Leaders

CRIT-SL

Criticizing SL

Senior Leaders

DIS-SL

Disobeying SL

Senior Leaders

ENG-SL

Engaging SL

Senior Leaders

FLW-SL

Following SL

Senior Leaders

PRA-SL

Praising SL

Standards of
Care

ADP-STA

Adapting Standards

Standards of
Care

ADV-STA

Advocating Standards

Standards of
Care

DEF-STA

Defining Standards

Standards of
Care

DEN-ST-VAL

Denying Standard
Validity

Standards of
Care

DEV-NEW-STA

Developing New
Standards

Standards of
Care

EM-STA

Emerging Standards

Standards of
Care

QUALIFY-STANMAK

Qualifying Standard
Makers

Participant
describes or relates
experiences as a
senior leader
Attempts to
persuade senior
leaders
Criticizing senior
leaders
Disobeying or
undermining
senior leaders
Contacting,
meeting with, or
seeking input from
senior leaders
Following
decisions of senior
leaders
Praising senior
leaders
Adapting
standards to local
agency needs
Advocating for
adoption or
compliance to
standards
Defining standards
or protocols
Stating a standard
should not apply
or is not feasible
Development or
creation of
standards or
procedures
Emerging, but not
adopted or
formally in
development
Mention of
qualifications of
standard makers or
lack of
qualifications
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Time

ADD-TIME

Taking Additional
Time

Time

ADV-TIME

Advocating Time
Commitments

Time

ID-TIME-COST

Identifying Time as
Cost

Time

LA-TIME

Lacking Time to Meet
Standards

Time

REJ-TIME

Rejecting / Devaluing
Time Commitments

Time

SET-TIME-PRO

Setting Programmatic
Timeframes

Tasks, protocols,
or programs take
more time than
prior to
implementation
(projected or after
the fact)
Advocating that
time commitments
are worth benefit
Expressions that
time costs money
or expressions of
time as a nonrenewable
resource /
commodity
Lacking time to
meet standards,
protocols, or
program
commitments
Statements or
feelings that time
required to meet
standards,
protocols, or
program is too
high a cost or
benefits are not
worth time
investment
Setting timeframes
to meet for
standards,
protocols, or
programs
including but not
limited to time to
answer calls, time
from call to
dispatch,
timeframe for
reviews to be
completed,
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timeframes to
meet
programmatic
goals
Training Factors

ADP-TR

Adapting Training

Adapting Training

Training Factors

DEN-TR

Training Factors
Training Factors

FUN-TR
INT-PR-TR

Training Factors
Training Factors

LA-TR
PR-EX-TR

Training Factors

PR-IN-TR

Training Factors
Trusted Insiders

STAFF-TR
BU-TR-TI

Denying Training
Applicability
Funding Training
Internalizing Previous
Training
Lacking Training
Providing External
Training
Providing In-Service
Training
Staffing Training
Building Trust as TI

Trusted Insiders

FAIL-TI

Failing as TI

Trusted Insiders

ID-TI

Identifying TI

Trusted Insiders

NEG-EV-TI

Negotiating Evidence
as TI

Trusted Insiders

PRES-EV-TI

Presenting Evidence
as TI

Denying Training
Applicability
Funding Training
Internalizing
Previous Training
Lacking Training
Providing External
Training
Providing InService Training
Staffing Training
Building trust with
other insiders or
within
organizational
culture
Failing to become
a trusted insider or
building trust
Participant
identifying as a
trusted insider
Negotiating the
validity of
evidence as a
trusted insider
Presenting
evidence as a
trusted insider
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Appendix C
Focus Group Opening
Opening Remarks (Paraphrase): Thank you for joining me today. I asked you all here
today to discuss PSAP quality improvement from a NYS wireless PSAP leader
perspective. You were all selected based on your current job description as experts in the
matter. Your individual feelings, thoughts, and ideas on this topic are very important.
You all filled out consent forms to participate in the study which included a promise by
me to keep your information confidential. My hope is that we all respect that
confidentiality, so we can all speak freely and ensure what we hear today are people’s
actual feelings, thoughts, or ideas and not necessarily the official policy of their agency. I
am recording these sessions, so we can transcribe what is said today into text for analysis.
I may be contacting each of you later to ensure the transcription is correct. Does anyone
have any questions or concerns before we begin? (Answer any questions). Alright, first
question . . .
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Appendix D
Organizational Questionnaire
1. What is your pseudonym? _______________
2. What is the population (to nearest 5,000) of your county? _______________
3. To nearest 1,000, how many 9-1-1 calls did your PSAP receive in 2016? _______
4. Please indicate which discipline(s) your PSAP serves as the primary calltaking
entity in your county (check all that apply)
a. Police
b. Fire
c. EMS
5. Please indicate which discipline(s) your PSAP serves as the primary dispatch
entity in your county (check all that apply)
a. Police
b. Fire
c. EMS
6. Please indicate which discipline(s) you perform routine randomized quality
improvement reviews for calltaking (check all that apply)
a. Police
b. Fire
c. EMS
7. Please indicate which discipline(s) you perform routine randomized quality
improvement reviews for CAD Entry (check all that apply)
a. Police Calls for Service
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b. Police Traffic Stops
c. Fire
d. EMS
8. Please indicate which discipline(s) you perform routine randomized quality
improvement reviews for compliance to dispatch policies (check all that apply)
a. Police Calls for Service
b. Police Traffic Stops
c. Fire
d. EMS
9. Do you use vendor generated protocols / software / procedures? _________. If so
please indicate the vendor(s) next to each discipline.
a. Police _______________
b. Fire

_______________

c. EMS _______________
10. Are you and accredited PSAP? _______________. If so list your accreditations.
a. Police _______________
b. Fire

_______________

c. EMS _______________
d. Other _______________
11. Do you have dedicated staff whose primary duties are quality improvement /
quality assurance? _________.
a. If so, how many positions was your PSAP authorized in 2016? _________
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Appendix E
Table of PSAP Quality Improvement Factors

Table E1
PSAP Quality Improvement Factors
Positive
Training
Reviews
Accreditation

Neutral
Organizational Culture
Stakeholder Engagement

Negative
Time
Staffing
Funding
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